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ABSTRACT	
  
This	
  theoretical	
  study	
  explores	
  the	
  phenomenon	
  of	
  anxiety	
  and	
  how	
  it	
  has	
  
been	
  understood,	
  articulated	
  and	
  treated	
  over	
  time	
  in	
  psychoanalysis.	
  Formulations	
  
of	
  anxiety	
  in	
  classical	
  theory,	
  object	
  relations,	
  attachment,	
  interpersonal,	
  relational	
  
and	
  trauma	
  theory	
  will	
  be	
  explored,	
  offering	
  a	
  counterpoint	
  to	
  the	
  current	
  medical	
  
model	
  in	
  which	
  anxiety	
  is	
  primarily	
  understood	
  as	
  a	
  symptom	
  to	
  be	
  eradicated	
  
through	
  medication	
  and	
  “evidence	
  based”	
  treatments.	
  The	
  study	
  argues	
  that	
  anxiety	
  
only	
  exists	
  within	
  a	
  relational	
  and	
  systemic	
  context,	
  and	
  that	
  reducing	
  anxiety	
  to	
  a	
  
set	
  of	
  discrete	
  disorders	
  requiring	
  prescriptive	
  treatment	
  protocols	
  often	
  overlooks	
  
the	
  complexity	
  of	
  individual	
  experience	
  and	
  need	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  discounting	
  
psychodynamic	
  treatment	
  options	
  that	
  are	
  also	
  effective.	
  Finally	
  the	
  study	
  will	
  end	
  
with	
  a	
  composite	
  case	
  study	
  that	
  further	
  illustrates	
  the	
  theories	
  discussed,	
  and	
  that	
  
also	
  demonstrates	
  the	
  functions	
  and	
  meanings	
  of	
  anxiety	
  within	
  a	
  relational	
  context.	
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CHAPTER I
Introduction

. . . I believe that it is fairly safe to say that anybody and everybody
devotes much of his lifetime, a great deal of his energy . . . and a good part
of his efforts in dealing with others to avoiding more anxiety than he
already has and, if possible, to getting rid of this anxiety (Sullivan, 1953
P.11).
If one embraces Sullivan’s understanding of anxiety as central, if not the central,
phenomenon shaping human behavior and relationships, then the study of anxiety, its
functions, and its role in clinical work would seem to be indispensable.
Various psychoanalytic theories from Freud onwards have grappled with theorizations of
anxiety and its role in human development and relationships. These include ego
psychology, object relations, and attachment theory as well as contemporary relational
and trauma theory among others. An examination of these theories will offer insight into
the etiology of anxiety, its adaptive functions in development and survival, its underlying
role in many types of pathology, as well as the ways that it informs clinical practice.
Anxiety and its functions, like all affective experience, remains intangible and difficult to
define, and in this sense always remains beyond explanation or theorization. Perhaps the
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ongoing preoccupation with anxiety as a phenomenon within psychology and mental
health is rooted not only on the ubiquitous nature of its presence, but in the impossibility
of defining its place and function.
Despite the elusive nature of anxiety and the complex and often contradictory
ways that anxiety has been understood within psychoanalysis, few concepts have been
more central to the development of the field of psychology, including its most recent
incarnation within a medical model. Currently, forms of anxiety are the most commonly
diagnosed set of discrete disorders (second only to depression) within the medical model
that dominates mental health practices in the United States and most other parts of the
world.
This theoretical study is concerned with examining psychoanalytic formulations
of anxiety that challenge the current hegemonic notion of anxiety as a discrete disorder,
positing it instead as an integral aspect of human development and relationships. Chapter
I examines the scope of anxiety as a disorder within the medical model, its prevalence
and the populations it effects, as well as the treatment practices most commonly used to
reduce or to eradicate it as a symptom. This chapter will also provide a literature review
of various empirical or evidence-based studies conducted on anxiety disorders and their
treatment. The chapter will focus on the empirical viability of psychodynamically
oriented treatments compared to behaviorally oriented treatments such as CBT or the use
of psychiatric medications that have become the treatments of choice within most mental
health systems in the United States and internationally.
Chapter II will then trace the history of key psychoanalytic formulations of
anxiety that inform current treatment practices. The chapter will begin with classical
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Freudian theories about anxiety along with Melanie Klein’s object relations framework.
Anxiety in Winnicott’s self-psychology and Bowlby’s attachment theory will also be
examined. Chapter III will explore how theorizations of anxiety inform the increasingly
dyadic focus of Harry Stack Sullivan’s interpersonal theory. The next section of this
chapter will examine how relational theorists such as Stephen Mitchell integrate object
relations and attachment theories with interpersonal theory creating a dyadic and
decentered approach in which anxiety can only exists within a relational matrix. Phil
Bromberg’s relational conception of multiple self-states and processes of dissociation
will also be explored.
In the final discussion, Chapter IV, I will use a composited case study drawn from
experiences in my most recent placement at a college mental health center in order to
illustrate the theories previously discussed, with a focus on how anxiety functions and
becomes an integral part of treatment within a relational psychodynamic approach. One
of the primary reasons I chose anxiety as a focus of this study is the very high prevalence
of anxiety symptoms within this population and setting. The counseling center where I
was placed was by definition a brief treatment clinic. This case study will also explore the
ways that systemic expectations and demands shape treatment options as well as the
kinds of enactment, rupture, and repair that are a central feature of psychoanalytic
treatment. In conclusion, this chapter ends with an argument for the necessity of a range
of treatment options that both reduce anxiety as a symptom, but that also offer
alternatives to the dominant medical model that often rigidly defines forms of anxiety and
provide corresponding treatment practices that do not necessarily meet the needs of the
patient or the community of which they are part.
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CHAPTER II
On the Phenomenon of Anxiety

Statement of Problem, Scope and Populations Affected
The National Comorbidity Survey-Replication conducted from 2001-2003 to
gather information on mental health disorders in the United States found that 28.8% of
the general population meets criteria for at least one of the following anxiety disorders:
panic disorder (PD), agoraphobia (AGO), social phobia (SAD), post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) (Himle et al, 2008). According
to an analysis of the NCS-R data by Kessler et al. prior to the release of the DSM-V,
anxiety disorders have one of the highest rates of lifetime prevalence second only to
major depressive episodes (2012). The lifetime morbid risk (LMR) for a major depressive
episode is 16.6% while the LMR for anxiety disorders is as follows: 15.6% for specific
phobias, 10.7% for social phobia, 6.7% for social anxiety disorder (SAD), 5.7% for post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Kessler et. al, 2012). The less common anxiety
disorders are generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) with an LMR of 4.3%, panic disorder
(PD) without agoraphobia at 3.7%, agoraphobia with or without panic disorder (AGO)
2.5% and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) 2.3% (Kessler et. al, 2012) The
diagnostic prevalence of anxiety disorders in the United States underscores the
importance for social workers, policy makers, and other mental health professionals, of
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understanding the etiology of anxiety, its clinical implications, and theoretical
frameworks.
In their research on psychodynamic treatments for anxiety disorders, SlavinMulford and Hilsenroth (2012) write:
Anxiety disorders are associated with severe impairments in functioning
and have significant emotional and financial costs both on personal and
societal levels. For example, patients with panic disorder have higher rates
of morbidity and health care utilization than patients both with and
without other psychiatric disorders leading them to account for 20% of all
emergency room visits. Similarly, when compared with people suffering
from 25 other mental disorders or common physical conditions, people
with a diagnosis of GAD report missing the most work. Thus, given the
high prevalence, impairment, and cost of anxiety disorders, it is essential
to continue to develop and test treatments for anxiety (p. 117).
According to the NCS-R and the Adolescent Supplement (NCS-A), Kessler et. al.
found that anxiety disorders are common to both men and women, but that women are at
increased risk for all anxiety disorders (2012). In the cases of GAD, AGO, SAD and
PTSD, women reported close to or more than twice the lifetime prevalence to men for
these disorders. Most anxiety disorders have the highest lifetime prevalence for adults
between the ages of 18 and 64. However, all population groups had the highest rate of
onset for GAD, SAD, PD, PTSD and AGO in the late teens through the early twenties.
Living below the poverty level, fewer years of education, and being divorced, separated,
or never having married all increased the odds for different 12-month anxiety disorders.
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Using the NCS-R data, several studies have also examined the rates of anxiety

disorders among different ethnic and racial groups in the US. Breslau et al. found that
non-Hispanic whites had significantly higher rates of GAD compared to non-Hispanic
blacks or Hispanics (2006). Whites also had higher rates of PD and SAD compared to
other groups. In their comparative study of anxiety disorders in African Americans, non
Hispanic whites, and Caribbean blacks, Himle et al. write that “Increased risk for most
anxiety disorders among whites remains somewhat counterintuitive given increased
social and economic stressors experienced by blacks” (2009). The authors posit several
hypotheses to explain this phenomenon. The authors also found that, while the rates for
anxiety disorders were lower in general among African-Americans and Caribbean blacks
compared to whites, the lifetime prevalence for PTSD was higher for these two groups
than for whites. Furthermore, Himle et al. found a significant correlation between
race/ethnicity and the severity of mental illness for all anxiety disorders except
agoraphobia (2009). Whites reported the lowest levels of functional impairment
compared to African Americans and Caribbean blacks, and Caribbean blacks had the
highest proportion of cases in the severe category (Himle et al., 2009). In another study
that examined the relationship between race-based discrimination and non race-based
discrimination and GAD, Soto et al. found that non race based discrimination was a
predictor for GAD for all groups, but that in particular race-based discrimination was
associated with higher odds for predicting lifetime GAD only for African Americans
(2011).
A fuller discussion of the complex relationship between race, gender, class, age,
and anxiety disorders is beyond the scope of this phenomenon chapter, but the existing
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data raises important questions about the socially constructed nature of mental illness,
including anxiety disorders. Likewise, the data also raises important questions about the
relationship between race, socio-cultural, and socio-economic factors, and how these
inform etiology. The prevalence within different population groups may also be less an
expression of the quality of lived experience and more an expression of how states of
being are perceived by many individuals within groups and by the mental health
professionals who treat them.
Treatment for Anxiety Disorders
While the identification of anxiety disorders and their diagnostic prevalence
serves the useful function of framing their social and psychological significance and the
need for treatments, these diagnoses also highlight the degree to which anxiety is now
understood within a medical model. Anxiety as a phenomenon is predominantly thought
of as a set of disorders with related symptomology. One result of this is a turn to
psychiatric medication and/or cognitive behavioral therapies and interoceptive exposure
therapies aimed at eradicating or reducing unwanted symptoms. Alongside the use of
medications, CBT and other cognitive and exposure therapies are now considered the
“gold standard” in the treatment of anxiety. One of the most widely studied treatment
protocols developed by Barlow and Craske utilizes breathing retraining, cognitive
restructuring, and in vivo exposure in addition to IE (interoceptive exposure) (2008).
Several clinical trials have worked to demonstrate the efficacy of this treatment protocol,
and several other studies add onto or recalibrate this protocol to improve outcomes in
cases where the treatment is not effective (Welsh et al., 2010). Cognitive behavioral
therapies are now the most common form of treatment for anxiety in the United States
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and abroad. An international comparison survey of different psychotherapeutic
theoretical orientations demonstrated, with a few exceptions, that CBT is the most
common treatment for anxiety in most parts of the world (Hoffman S. et al, 2010).
In his book Crazy Like US: The Globalization of the American Psyche, Ethan
Watters argues that through processes of globalization, Western mental health has now
shaped the conceptualization of mental illness in most of the world such that the DSM
has become the “worldwide standard” (2010). Watters (2010) writes that
how people in a culture think about mental illnesses – how they categorize
and prioritize the symptoms, attempt to heal them and set expectations for
their course and outcome – influences the diseases themselves. In teaching
the rest of the world to think like us, we have been, for better and worse,
homogenizing the way the world goes mad (p. 2).
While Watters is most concerned here with Western homogenization of mental illness,
his logic can equally be applied to the United States and anxiety disorders. Indeed the
conceptualization of anxiety as a set of individuated disorders based on certain
symptomology, and the treatments used to target those symptoms, undoubtedly effects
the prevalence and presentation of those disorders in America and how different
population groups understand and experience the nature of their own mental health. Yet
it is important to point out that the specificity and prevalence of anxiety disorders not
only reflects an “era of anxiety” and its dialectical relationship with the mental health
classification system, but also the growing body of professional knowledge based on
research and clinical experience that informs the constantly evolving nature of diagnosis
and treatment. The diagnoses of Panic Disorder and Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia
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only became distinct diagnostic categories differentiated from free-floating anxiety with
the release of the DSM III in 1980 (Craske and Barlowe, 2008). The increasing precision
of diagnostic criteria points to both the nuanced differentiation of clinical presentations
over time and the evolving and contingent nature of diagnoses. Likewise, treatment
options reflect the focus on and prioritization of certain symptoms.
Literature Review
While there is ample research and clinical data demonstrating that CBT and
medication can be effective in helping patients manage and reduce anxiety symptoms, the
increasing focus on CBT and medication is part of the medical model’s prioritization of
symptoms that often ignores the full complexity of individual biopsychosocial make-up.
Furthermore, psychoanalytic formulations and treatments that may be equally if not more
helpful to some patients than CBT are increasingly devalued and shunted aside for what
are now viewed as more cost effective, evidence-based treatments.
However, a recent comparative study of the longterm effects of CBT and Short
Term Psychodynamic Therapy (STPP) for the treatment of GAD (generalized anxiety
disorder) revealed that both produced large improvements at the 12 months follow up
(Salzer et al, 2011). However, in terms of worry and trait anxiety, CBT was found to be
superior. The Hamilton anxiety scale was used as the primary measure, and treatments
were carried out for both CBT and STPP according to manuals. The study began with 57
participants diagnosed with GAD, and only 41 followed through with treatment until the
12 month follow up. The small sample size of the study limits its generalizability, and the
focus on worry and exposure to worry that is part of the focus in CBT raises the
possibility that an increased focus on exposure to worry in STPP may improve outcomes
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in terms of trait anxiety and worry. However, the authors also point out that, in
psychodynamic therapy, worry is often conceived of as a defense that protects the client
from other feelings or conflicts, and so the focus on worry itself would then become a
distraction from emotional states and fantasies that are more threatening than the worries
themselves (Salzer et al, 2011). In this regard, a focus on symptom reduction as opposed
to a broader range of affective experiences of self in relationships can also skew the
perceived benefits of psychodynamic treatments.
While there have been several studies of the efficacy of STPP for anxiety
disorders, none of them were structured with sufficient inter-rater reliability to make
them generalizable. In response to this lack of empirical stringency, Slavin-Mulford et al.
(2011) designed the first study of the efficacy of STPP with acceptable inter rater
reliability to examine how specific therapeutic techniques related to changes in anxiety
disorder patients. The authors (2011) also point out that there have been few treatment
studies that accurately examine the specific treatment strategies that produce patient
change in CBT. Slavin-Mulford et al. (2011) used the Comparative Psychotherapy
Process Scale to assess fidelity to certain therapeutic techniques and how they produced
change. Self-report scales for symptoms and level of functioning in different domains
along with external therapist reports were used to determine the efficacy of treatment at
various stages of therapy. Significant adaptive changes were found in anxiety symptoms,
global symptoms distress, interpersonal distress as well as social occupational
functioning. Over the course of treatment, 76% of patients reported anxiety symptoms
within a normal distribution, which is an improvement over past CB and psychodynamic
studies. Four therapeutic techniques in particular were meaningfully related to outcomes
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(Slavin-Mulford et al., 2011). These include 1) focusing on wishes, fantasies, dreams and
early memories; 2) linking current feelings to perceptions of the past; 3) highlighting
patients typical patterns; 4) helping patients to understand their experiences in new ways.
All of these techniques are consistent with psychodynamic theories. Like the previous
study by Salzer at al. (2011), a limitation of this study is its generalizability due to the
small sample size of 21 patients. Six of these patients were also stabilized on anxiolytic
and/or antidepressant medication for three months prior to treatment, but were included
in the study because they requested additional treatment to meet their personal goals.
A 12-month comparison study by Ferrero et al. (2007) of brief psychodynamic,
psychotherapy, and pharmacotherapy for patients diagnosed with GAD in a community
setting, shed more light on the efficacy of medication and psychodynamic therapy. This
study sample included 87 patients with GAD with or without an Axis I and Axis II
comorbidity. The aim of the study was to assess the 6 month outcome of patients being
treated with Brief Adlerian Psychodynamic Psychotherapy B-APP, a version of STPP,
compared to pharmacologic treatment or combined treatment. There was also a 1-year
follow up to determine the maintenance after six months of ending treatment. Multiple
measures were used to track patient progress including the Clinical Global Impression
(CGI), The Hamilton rating scale for anxiety and depression, The Social Occupation
Functioning Scale (SOFAS) and The Verona Satisfaction Service Scale. Because
medication is currently the primary treatment offered to patients with GAD at most
outpatient clinics due to the perceived expense of long term psychotherapy, Ferrero et al.
(2007) wanted to assess the effectiveness of B-APP compared to medication alone or
medication combined with therapy. Results showed that both therapy alone and
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medication alone yielded relative good remission rates for GAD (67% and 63%
respectively) at the one year mark. Medication combined with therapy yielded 80%
remission rates at the one year mark. Of note, subjects with personality disorders who
were treated with B-APP were more likely to exhibit improved socio-occupational skills.
The authors conclude that B-APP is an effective monotherapy for GAD, and for patients
with more severe GAD or a comorbid personality disorder, B-APP combined with
medication is often most effective. One limitation of this study is that B-APP is nonmanualized, but the authors point out that some studies have demonstrated that nonmanualized treatments are as effective as manualized ones. Another limitation is the
small sample size, even though this study has a much larger sample than most studies on
the treatment of GAD.
While all of these studies focus on the use of different forms of STPP, in another
study conducted by Knekt et al. (2008), a group of 326 outpatients diagnosed with either
an anxiety disorder or depression were randomly assigned to either STPP, solution
focused therapy, or long term therapy in order to determine the efficacy of these
treatments on work ability for patients with psychiatric disorders. In order to measure
efficacy, the study used the Work Ability Index, (WAI), the Work Subscale (SAS-Work)
of the Social Adjustment Scale (SAS-R), the perceived Psychological Functioning Scale,
the prevalence of patients employed or studying, and the number of sick-leave days. The
study found that work ability was significantly improved according to all of these
measures during each phase of the 3-year follow up. There was no significant difference
between the two kinds of short term therapy, but these two therapies showed 4-11%
improved work ability at the 7 month follow up over long term therapy. At the second
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year follow up there was no difference between therapies. However, at the third year
follow up, test scores for long term therapy showed 5-12% improvement indicating that
while short term therapies produce quicker improvement, long term therapies produce
greater longevity of benefits over time. As with the other studies of psychodynamic
therapy previously discussed here, due to ethical considerations there was no control
group. Treatment was also not manualized, and whether or not this reduced reliability of
the study remains a debated issue.
A literature review by Blagys and Hilsenroth (2002) of existing comparative
studies of CBT versus psychodynamic-interpersonal therapies (PI), aimed at
distinguishing the specific characteristics of CBT from other therapies in order to
determine the relationship of these techniques to outcomes. The authors suggest that
recent research investigating the relationship between CBT interventions and patient
outcomes have yielded discrepant results. They argue that some of the positive
correlations between CBT techniques and patient improvement are not related to specific
cognitive interventions. Rather several studies that they reference from the literature
suggest that techniques employed from PI are increasingly used in CB therapies and
account for some of the positive outcomes. These include a greater emphasis on the
therapeutic relationship, exploration of defensive processes, an emphasis on patients’
affect, an acknowledgement of unconscious processes in human experience, and an
increased focus on patient’s developmental experiences. Along with the increasing
overlap in therapeutic techniques, the authors identified six characteristics that
distinguished CBT from PI. These include an emphasis on homework, direction of
session activity, teaching skills to cope with symptoms, focus on patient’s future
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experiences, providing patient with information about treatment and his or her disorder,
and a focus on the patients’ cognitive/intrapersonal experiences. It is important to note
that in several studies reviewed, patient improvement was not strongly correlated to
changes to maladaptive cognitions, which traditionally has been considered one of
theoretical cornerstones of CB therapies.
Langmore and Worrell (2007) continue to build upon this analysis and examine
critically the empirical anomalies in the literature. They identify three anomalies in the
literature. First, there is little evidence that changing cognition improves outcome.
Second, CBT is often associated with rapid and early improvement in symptoms that
most often likely occur before the implementation of any specific cognitive techniques.
(It is useful to note here that, in their study of STPP treatment for anxiety, Slavin,
Mulford et al. (2011) found similar reports of rapid patient satisfaction and a feeling of
confidence in their ability to improve their symptoms at the third or fourth session.)
Third, cognitive mediators do not seem to precede changes in symptoms. In framing their
analysis of these anomalies, the author’s posit that researchers are increasingly:
proposing that multi-level cognitive architectures provide a more accurate
description of human cognition. For example, Brewin, in his recent M.B.
Shapiro Award Lecture (Lawson 2005) questions the proposition that
challenging thought leads to changes in feelings and behaviors. Drawing
on the finding of cognitive science, he proposes that human cognition
comprises multiple memory systems and knowledge stores, not all of
which are open to introspection. Further, he suggests that these multiple
systems give rise to multiple self-representations. He concludes that
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therapy is better employed as a constructivist strengthening of more
helpful representations rather than a logico-deductive challenging of
unhelpful representations. . . .Likewise for Teasdale (1997) . . . .therapy
should focus on the clients “actual way of being” (p.150) rather than
logically challenging beliefs (p. 174).
A summary of component analysis of the literature led Longmore and Worrell

(2007) to conclude that cognitive interventions provide little or no added value to
behavioral interventions. While the authors reassert the effectiveness of CBT, they also
emphasize CBT’s status as an empirically grounded therapy, and call for further research
on what specific techniques are most effective in the treatment of disorders if changing
cognitions themselves is not the basis for improvement.
While this analysis of the literature argues that there is no clear indication that
treatment outcomes for CBT are any better or more evidence-based than psychodynamic
ones, the terms “evidence based” and “CBT” have over time become almost
synonymous. One primary reason for this is that CBT, at least in theory if not practice,
can be manualized in a way that many psychodynamic therapies cannot.
In a recent article titled “Where is the evidence for evidence based treatment?”,
Jonathan Shedler (2013) critiques a review of a CBT study in which the reviewers
uncritically state that outcomes in the study would improve if the clinicians who practice
CBT strictly adhered to the protocols laid out in manuals, when in fact no data was
collected offering evidence to support this claim. Shedler points to the unexamined set of
unsupported assumptions about effective treatment practices that underlies this analysis.
Shedler further argues that experienced clinicians change and modulate their approach
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based on their experience of what helps patients. He also asserts that most clinicians who
practice CBT rely on psychodynamic practices as well. A survey of CBT clinicians
shows that the vast majority of them choose to see psychodynamically-oriented therapists
for their own therapy and the influence of their own therapy on their work cannot be
underestimated (Wachtel, 2011). Thus, the conflation of CBT with evidence based
practice and the growing exclusion of psychodynamic approaches within the medical
model of treatment relies on arguments that are often not supported by any evidence.
Rationale and Clinical/Policy Implications of Project
While the preceding literature review serves the useful function of examining
some of the “evidence,” my purpose here is not to argue against CBT, or to claim that
psychodynamic therapy is more effective, but to propose that an exploration and
reevaluation of a core concept such as anxiety and its place in treatment can destabilize
the dominance of the current medical model in which patients are too often
problematized and reduced to their symptoms. My own focus on empirical evidence in
this phenomenon chapter in order to assert the validity of psychodynamic treatments,
clearly obviates my biases and how they inform this study. This focus also reproduces
some of the closed logic that underpins the current loss of a more holistic, spiritual and
socially conscious approach to mental health that is also part of the medical model.
However, in subsequent chapters I hope to expand this framework; I will explore the
concept of anxiety historically and conceptually within classical theory, interpersonal
psychology, object relations, attachment, relational, and trauma theory, in order to shed
light on the etiology, functions, and clinical utility of anxiety not only as a symptom or
diagnosis but as in as an integral part of development and treatment. My hope is that a
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multifaceted approach to understanding anxiety can destabilize and expand the narrow
rationales and logic behind current treatment trends.
My other hope is that this project will help erode some false divides between
treatment practices so that each can borrow from the other without unnecessary
judgments. Furthermore, many insurance companies only offer limited coverage when it
comes to mental health. Since social workers often work within agencies and large
systems where a combination of time pressure, financial concerns, and
patient/community socio-economic status dictate forms of available treatment, valuable
psychodynamic theories and practices that cannot be manualized or that may require
more sessions, may increasingly get lost. Nowhere is this more evident than in the current
medical focus on anxiety as a symptom and a disorder divorced from its other complex
functions and meanings for the individual within his or her internal and external social
context.
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CHAPTER III
Psychoanalytic Theorizations of Anxiety: Classical Perspectives,
Object Relations and Attachment Theories

In the case of external danger the organism has recourse to attempts at
flight. . . . Repression is an equivalent of this attempt at flight. . . . . The
problem of how anxiety arises in connection with repression is no simple
one; but we may legitimately hold firmly to the idea that the ego is the seat
of anxiety and give up our earlier view that the cathectic energy of the
repressed impulse is automatically turned into anxiety (Freud, 1926, p.
92).

No concept is more central to psycho-analytical theory than the concept of
anxiety. Yet it is one about which there is little consensus . . . . All
analysts are agreed that anxiety cannot be explained simply by reference
to external threat: in some way processes usually thought of as internal
and instinctive seem to play a crucial role. But how these forces are
conceptualized and how they give rise to anxiety, that has always been a
puzzle (Bowlby, 1960, p. 91).
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As the opening quotes suggest, psychoanalysts have grappled with the question of

anxiety from Freud’s earliest formulations in classical theory to early attachment theorists
such as John Bowlby writing in the 1960’s. This chapter attempts to trace the arc of some
of these ideas as they evolved over the first half of the twentieth century. The chapter will
examine chronologically the ways that these ideas were absorbed, expanded upon, and
challenged by other major theorists as psychoanalysis sought to come to an increasingly
accurate, nuanced, and clinically useful theorization of anxiety. A discussion of anxiety
in the work of Sigmund Freud and Anna Freud lays the foundation for an exploration of
Melanie Klein’s work and the role of anxiety in object relations theory. Both classical
theory and object relations theory contained the seeds of attachment theory, ideas that
found fuller expression in the work of the attachment theorists such as Bowlby selfpsychologists like Winnicott. My hope is to capture a few of the central formulations of
anxiety put forth by each of these influential theorists. I will explore the connection
between their ideas in order to gain greater insight into anxiety as a phenomenon, the
ways it has evolved in psychoanalytic theory, and the ways that these foundational
theories inform more contemporary theorizations of anxiety, including interpersonal
theory, relational theory, and trauma theory, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
As the opening quote indicates, late in his career Freud changed his conception of
anxiety. At first he viewed it as a kind of discharge phenomena, arising from the pressure
of repressed libido (Wachtel 2011). In the opening passage from Freud’s later work
“Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety,” he abandons this earlier economic understanding,
and in his new formulation, anxiety is a signal mediated or called forth by the ego that
leads to repression, the primary defense for Freud. He goes on to argue that anxiety
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begins during the trauma of birth, and this experience continues in new forms after the
baby enters the world:
When the infant has found out by experience that an external, perceptible
object can put an end to the dangerous situation which is reminiscent of
birth, the content of the danger it fears is displaced from the economic
situation on to the condition which determined the situation, viz. the loss
of object. It is the absence of the mother that is now the danger; and as
soon as the danger arises the infant gives the signal of anxiety before the
dreaded economic situation has set in. This change constitutes the first
great step forward in the provision made by the infant for its selfpreservation, and at the same time represents a transition from the
automatic and involuntary fresh appearance of anxiety to the intentional
reproduction of anxiety as a signal of danger (1926, p.137).
In this groundbreaking passage, Freud distinguishes between two main types of anxiety:
automatic anxiety and signal anxiety. Automatic anxiety, such as the distress an infant
feels upon birth, when he is hungry, or hears a loud noise, is the earliest, most primitive
form of inescapable or “fresh” anxiety experienced almost at an organic level. For this
reason, it is sometimes called annihilation anxiety since this phrase captures the degree to
which it can overwhelm and terrify (Schamess and Shilkret, 2011). Through the
relationship with the mother or caregiver, the infant learns that his/her anxiety can end
through an external object. The danger signal that is automatic or hardwired into the
baby at birth is “displaced” onto the object or caregiver. Thus, automatic anxiety
becomes a signal essential for survival in relationship with the object and the loss of the
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object. Here Freud lays the foundation for object relations and attachment theorists such
as Klein, Winnicott, and Bowlby who would further his ideas in subsequent decades.
He also posits another striking idea that informed Klein’s work and continues to
inform contemporary interpersonal, trauma, and relational theory -- namely that affective
states (Freud points out that we are unable to define them) are there from the beginning of
life; anxiety occupies no greater or lesser significance than others, but rather serves a
specific survival function that adapts to each successive stage of development. In this
regard, all development whether it be understood as “normative” or “pathological” is
composed of the same affective materials including anxiety. While this insight may seem
self-evident, it underscores the experience near phenomenon of psychoanalysis itself,
whereby a therapist can empathically enter into another person’s affective experience and
have an understanding of it, almost as if it were his or her own.
If anxiety is universal and is understood as an affective signal of danger
originating in the ego as part of its protective and synthetic functions, how then does
Freud understand the difference between an external threat, the danger posed by the loss
of the object, and the internal danger posed by an instinctual impulse? Freud writes:
Anxiety is a reaction to a situation of danger. It is obviated by the ego’s
doing something to avoid that situation or to withdraw from it. It might be
said that symptoms are created so as to avoid the generating of anxiety.
But this does not go deep enough. It would be truer to say that symptoms
are created so as to avoid a danger situation whose presence has been
signaled by the generation of anxiety (1926, p.128).
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In order to illustrate the connection between the ego, anxiety, and symptoms,

Freud uses animal phobias in children. He understood animal phobias to be an expression
of castration anxiety whereby fear of castration and of punishment by the super-ego
becomes depersonalized or conflated with fear of something in the external world – the
fear of an animal. The benefit of this symptomology is that an animal can be avoided
whereas a father cannot.
While the centrality of castration anxiety in this formulation and in Freudian drive
theory in general has, for most theorists, long since lost its explanatory power, Freud’s
observation in the above passage remains a fascinating one: namely that symptoms are an
attempt by the ego to avoid a danger situation whether internal or external, and thereby
are an attempt to reduce anxiety. Thus a phobia, social anxiety, generalized anxiety, or
any other form of anxiety that we now diagnostically label in today’s medical model as a
distinct disorder with related symptomology, is, when viewed through the lens of
Freudian theory, simply a signal of internal or external danger. Understood this way,
anxiety is never a symptom or diagnosis on it own.
Indeed the focus on anxiety as a symptom and on its eradication through
treatment ignores the underlying etiology of anxiety, and its generation and overgeneration by the ego. The original instinctual impulse is given truncated expression in
the form of a symptom, the ego’s attempt to reduce anxiety. Furthermore, the ego,
through its integrative synthetic function, tries to “prevent symptoms from remaining
isolated and alien by using every possible method to bind them to itself in one way or
another” (Freud, 1926, p. 98). In this process the symptom occupies what Freud called
“extra-territoriality.” It becomes hidden, invisible to the ego itself. The symptom only
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becomes apparent if in some way repression has failed. The presence of anxiety in this
case can be understood as a danger signal that must be sent over and over again to
reactivate repression and or other defenses.
Anxiety and the Defenses
Anna Freud continued working within Freud’s drive theory and his structural
model, but became increasingly interested in the ego itself as the primary mechanism by
which each individual mediates between the demands of internal and external realities.
Like her father, she understood symptoms as a kind of “compromise” made by the ego
through various methods of defense against instinctual demands (A. Freud, 1946).
However, along with repression, Anna Freud delineated a variety of other defenses by
which the ego sought to mediate between the instincts (id), the super ego, and the moral
and ethical imperatives of the external world. This expanded exploration and focus on
mechanisms of defense raises the question of how anxiety relates to the ego and its
various defensive processes other than repression. Anna Freud argued that the ego itself
had no quarrel with any of the instincts, and only utilized defense processes under
pressure from the super-ego, the “mischief-maker” (A. Freud 1946, p. 59). The ego is
motivated by what she called “super-ego anxiety” (A. Freud, 1946, p. 59). Yet Anna
Freud also argued that while children defend against their impulses, this is not motivated
by super-ego anxiety but by the threat of punishment or prohibition from adults in the
outside world. She called this fear produced by external forces, “object anxiety” (A.
Freud, 1946, p. 61).
In her estimation, the origin of anxiety whether it be super–ego anxiety or object
anxiety made no difference at all to the ego. She writes, “the crucial point is that, whether

	
  

	
  

24	
  

it be dread of the outside world or dread of the super-ego it is the anxiety which sets the
defensive processes going. The symptoms which enter consciousness as a result of this
process do not enable us to determine which type of anxiety in the ego has produced
them” (1946, p. 61). In essence, this is a similar argument to that of her father who
conflated castration anxiety with real dangers in the outside world.
According to both father and daughter, the ego and the id are still not
differentiated in children, and it is only as people get older and the “the pleasure
principal” is replaced by the “reality principal” (A. Freud, 1946, p.63) that the ego begins
to mistrust the instincts. This transition in development is the root of anxiety in neurotic
symptomology. Anna Freud writes that if “the ego feels abandoned by these protective
higher powers [the super-ego and the outside world] or if the demands of the instinctual
impulses become excessive, its [the ego’s] hostility to instinct is intensified to the point
of anxiety ” (1946, p. 63). Whether anxiety is instinctual, super-ego, objective, or an
affect related to instinct, the result is the same activation of defenses. In practice, the
analyst can only determine the source of anxiety by the strength of a patient’s resistance
when the analyst begins to dismantle the patient’s defenses. For example, a patient who
has super-ego anxiety will experience a sense of guilt around his instincts whereas a
patient who has object anxiety may experience threat from the outside world.
Anxiety is a signal that activates the ego’s defenses; however, repression is only
one defense among the others with no primary place among the ego’s functions. As a
result of Anna Freud’s work, projection, undoing, identification, reaction formation,
denial, and other defenses became an integral part of ego psychology and the popular
lexicon that carries over to the present day. Regardless of which defense is activated,
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anxiety in ego psychology is not in itself a symptom, nor does the origin of anxiety
necessarily predict which defense is activated by the ego since the same defense could be
used in response to either an external danger or a threatening impulse. The primary area
of focus for ego psychologists was identifying neurotic defenses and the unconscious
instinctual impulses that had been converted by the ego into symptoms.
Melanie Klein and Object Relations Theory
The mid-century split between ego psychologists modeled after Anna Freud and
Kleinians, led to the creation of distinct psychoanalytic societies, suggesting an
unbridgeable rift. Yet, many of Klein’s fundamental ideas are a grounded in Freudian
drive theory and ego defenses. However, unlike Anna Freud, who did not link particular
types of anxiety with the activation of particular defenses, Klein focused on the ways that
drives activate certain defenses that operate as an integral part of early development.
Thus, it is easy to see how the two theoretical approaches seemed incompatible, or even
diametrically opposed, even though they are both firmly grounded in Freudian drive
theory.
Klein accepts Freud’s theorization of the libidinal and aggressive drives that
corresponds to the life and death instincts. However, for Klein, anxiety was not just
automatic or a signal generated by the ego for survival; rather anxiety in the form of the
“death instinct” and “annihilation anxiety” are present from the beginning of life and
remain the core affective experience undergirding the rest of human development. She
writes in the opening sentences of her later work:
I have for many years held the view that the working of the death instinct
within gives rise to the fear of annihilation and that this is the primary

	
  

	
  

26	
  
cause for persecutory anxiety. It would appear that the pain and discomfort
he [the infant] has suffered, as well as the loss of the intra-uterine state, are
felt by him as an attack by hostile forces, i.e. as persecution. Persecution
anxiety, therefore, enters from the beginning into his relation to objects in
so far as he is exposed to privations (Klein, 1952, p. 61).

Here, anxiety is no longer a signal of danger, but exists in relation to objects and is rooted
in the experience of persecution in the form a hostile attack. The infant lives in a
phantasmagoric world where he or she can be annihilated at any moment. This increase
in persecutory anxiety heightens his or her own aggressive and destructive impulses. As
Ruth Stein (1990) argues in her analysis of Klein’s work in the 30’s, sadism takes the
form of fear of attack, which increases the child’s sadistic impulses. However, these
impulses are not channeled into psychosexual stages as they are for Freud, but become
attached to objects in the child’s life that are both continually introjected (internalized)
and projected onto (expelled or externalized), setting in motion a circular pattern within
relationships. It could be argued that these defensive operations and the degree to with
they protect the infant’s fragile ego from their own aggressive impulses lays the
foundation for dangerous relational cycles that continue into adulthood, a formulation
that bears a close resonance with Freud’s concept of the repetition compulsion in
relationships. For Klein, object relations in infancy are directly connected to the same
affects and defensive processes in all people, and these underlie, moreso than the
psychosexual stages, the affects and ambivalence that structure the individual psyche in
relationship to others. The circular nature with which aggression generates anxiety and
anxiety generates aggression, internal impulses and external objects are projected and
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then introjected, then expelled again through projective identification, is emblematic of
the fluid and circular logic which structures Klein’s theory of how humans develop in
relationship; opposites continually exists alongside each other either isolated or split off
from each other or integrated by the ego to a greater or lesser extent.
This fundamental ambivalence between opposites extends in Klein’s work to the
life long struggle between antithetical affects. She writes: “The recurrent experiences of
gratification and frustration are powerful stimuli for libidinal and destructive impulses,
for love and hatred. As a result, the breast inasmuch as it is gratifying is loved and felt to
be ‘good’; in so far as it is a source of frustration, hated and felt to be ‘bad’ (Klein, 1952,
p. 62).
The infant’s ego is not developed enough to withstand annihilation anxiety, or to
realize that gratification and frustration, good and bad, love and hate exist in the same
object (the breast). Therefore, profound persecutory anxiety leads the infant to isolate
these affects through splitting in the earliest stages of development. In other words, the
bad breast and good breast cannot be allowed to exist in the same object or caregiver, just
as those same affects cannot exist simultaneously in the infant; the infant cannot destroy
the very object that gives it life and sustenance or believe that that same object is out to
destroy him or her if he or she is to accept, devour, and introject the good object. All of
this also requires the defenses of denial and idealization in order to keep the good object
completely separate from the existence of the bad. For Klein, the defense mechanisms of
isolation, splitting, denial, and idealization are a fundamental and unchanging process in
the earliest stage of infant development. She labeled this process the paranoid-schizoid
position.
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The infant’s experience of privation and gratification are indistinguishable from

their own fantasies and omnipotence and are constantly projected and introjected in selfreinforcing patterns. The universal nature of this affective process rooted in the death
instinct and persecution anxiety form the basis for both “normative” and “pathological”
development; the seed of both are present and possible in all people. Again this highlights
the experience near process of psychoanalysis: the ability of one person to empathize
with and enter the cognitive and affective experience of another even if the other is
understood as suffering from a “disorder” such as psychosis.
While Klein (1952) writes of the good breast and bad breast to capture the infant’s
dependency and the unintegrated schizoid nature of this stage, the relationship the infant
has to the mother’s breast extends to the mother’s bodily presence in all it forms. It could
be stated that the mother’s whole body is gradually introjected as an object, which also
implies the burgeoning possibility of greater psychic integration. Indeed for Klein, this is
what emerges out of early infancy as the good and bad objects gradually become attached
to the same caregiver.
The infant is in a constant process of establishing their object relationships. As the
infant attaches libidinal love-feelings to the object, projects this outward, and then
reintrojects these feelings in relationship to the caregiver, persecutory anxiety produced
by external hardship and aggressive impulses is counterbalanced by loving or good object
relations. Klein writes:
. . . the relation to both the internal and external world improves
simultaneously and the ego gains in strength and integration. Progress in
integration . . . depends on love-impulses predominating over destructive
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impulses, and leads to transitory states in which the ego synthesizes
feelings of love and destructive impulses towards one object (first the
mother’s breast) (1952, p. 65).

This early attempt by the ego at synthesis leads to what Klein calls the depressive
position, in which primitive defenses such as isolation, splitting, and denial give way to
greater synthesis and integration. Inherent in this process are the generation of
qualitatively different affective states. Klein writes:
All these processes of integration and synthesis cause the conflict between
love and hatred to come out in full force. The ensuing depressive anxiety
and feeling of guilt alter not only in quantity but in quality. Ambivalence
is now experienced predominantly toward a complete object. Love and
hatred have come much closer together and the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ breast,
‘good’ and ‘bad’ mother cannot be kept as widely separated as in the
earlier stage (1952, p. 72).
The infant’s destructive impulses are now experienced as a threat to the good object, and
Klein describes a complex process of guilt, inhibition of destructive impulses, and a kind
of mourning for the loss of the all good object that is inherent to the growing awareness
of what Klein calls “increasingly poignant psychic reality” (1952, p. 73). For Klein,
development and human relationships in general are shaped by the ambivalent affective
states that characterize the depressive position. She writes, “The anxiety relating to the
internalized mother who is felt to be injured, suffering, in danger of being annihilated, or
already annihilated and lost forever, leads to stronger identification with the injured
object” (1952, p. 73). Now the ego’s primary job is to reduce the depressive anxiety
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generated by the integration of ambivalent affects. Over time, the infant’s conception of
his or her parents comes closer to reality. The capacity to manage depressive anxiety is
directly related to the degree to which he or she was able to take in good objects in the
earlier phase.
In order to capture infant development, a phase of life that is ultimately
inaccessible to language, and is therefore on some level unknowable, Klein relies on
abstract language and theories to enter the realm of fantasy in ways that seem to resonate
with observed and lived experience. Her insistence on an infant full of destructive affects
who is fundamentally born into a psychotic state that is the foundation of development
can seem like a dark and somewhat fantastic conjecture depending on the reader. Yet
what Klein is really arguing in very sophisticated terms is what Ruth Stein calls (1990) a
theory of affect, a way to explain the complex mental processes that characterize both
‘normative’ and ‘pathological’ development. As Mitchell and Greenberg (1983) argue,
the drives for Klein are really affects that develop and exist in relationship. Put simply,
the caregiving environment either successfully reduces anxiety in its various forms or
increases it through a dialectical process of expulsion, absorption, and reabsorption of
external and internal objects, and this dynamic profoundly influences the developing ego.
Along with her focus on affect and the drives, Klein’s developing infant is also clearly
shaped by the quality of the relationship with the mother. In this regard, her work
contains many of the seeds of attachment theory.
Winnicott, Bowlby and Attachment Theory
Although Klein argued that persecution anxiety could be reduced through the
loving objects, infancy for Klein was fundamentally fraught with profound anxieties and

	
  

	
  

31	
  

ambivalence. By contrast, for Winnicott, the mother-child relationship was central to all
aspects of development and the quality of this relationship and not the drives, played the
most formative role in shaping development. He captured the nature of the mother-child
relationship with the concept of the “holding environment.” Flanagan aptly describes the
holding environment as “the capacity of the mother to create the world in such a way for
the baby that she feels held, safe, and protected from the dangers without and protected as
well from the dangers of emotions within” (2011, p. 127).
Winnicott distilled some of the complex object relations in Klein’s
phantasmagoric theorization into a more streamlined and accessible concept that is now
common in psychoanalytic theory as well as many parenting books. While parents may
not take reassurance in understanding their newborn as psychotic and fearing
annihilation, they can certainly embrace creating a loving safe environment in which the
child is protected from internal and external dangers and anxieties. No doubt this helps
explain why the holding environment has become a familiar concept and the paranoidschizoid position, regardless of its explanatory resonance, is not.
While Klein and Winnicott understood anxiety in some similar ways, they
conceptualized it using very different language. Just as Klein postulated that early object
relationships create the intrapsychic and relational processes that inform later pathologies
and relational dangers, Winnicott argued that “insanity” was grounded in what were
universal phenomena (1963); every person had the empathic capacity to understand the
“insane.” In his paper “Fear of Breakdown,” Winnicott (1963) replaces the concept of
annihilation anxiety with a common phenomenon he observes in many psychotic patients
– what he calls the “fear of breakdown.” By breakdown, Winnicott means a failure of a
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defense to protect ego organization rooted in early development when the infant is
entirely dependent on and undifferentiated from the mother. In Kleinian terms, this
might be understood as a failure of defensive processes to reduce annihilation and
persecution anxiety. Rather than using the concept of anxiety to explain early
development, Winnicott states that anxiety is not a strong enough word to describe what
he calls “primitive agonies” (1963, p. 89). Indeed for Winnicott (1963), anxiety did not
capture the agonizing fear that lead to early ego defenses, and psychotic illness was itself
a kind of defense against these.
Thus, the fear of breakdown that he observed in many of his patients was not the
fear of something new, or something that was about to happen, but the fear of psychic
deaths that had already occurred for the individual in early childhood as their ego
organization was forming. Winnicott writes, “it is the fear of the original agony which
caused the defence organization which the patient displays as an illness syndrome”
(1963, p. 90). Thus, it could be said that the patient does not have annihilation anxiety;
rather, the patient has already been annihilated, and what he or she fears are the psychic
deaths he has previously experienced which remain hidden in his unconscious. Like the
infant ego in Klein’s paranoid schizoid position, Winnicott argues that by unconscious he
means that “ego integration is not able to encompass something. The ego is too immature
to gather all the phenomenon into the area of personal omnipotence” (1963, p. 91). The
early experience remains hidden or isolated and split, precisely because the ego does not
have the capacity to integrate or encompass it. Therefore, the only way for the patient to
end his fear of breakdown is to actually have a breakdown or to “gather it into its own
present time experience and into omnipotent control (assuming the auxiliary ego-
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supporting function of the mother [analyst]” (Winnicott, 1963, p. 91). The ego can then
begin to integrate what the immature ego was unable to handle. In contrast to Klein,
Winnicott’s psychic deaths are not rooted in the drives, but are primarily created by
“failures in the facilitating environment” (1963, p. 91) that impinge on the individual in
ways that overwhelm his immature ego. Here Winnicott is implying the concepts that
underlie attachment, for what he is really positing is a failure in the holding environment
that disrupts attachment.
For Bowlby, such a failure in the caretaking environment is generated by
separation anxiety, the cornerstone of Bowlby’s theorization of anxiety and its role in
normative and pathogenic development. Like the object relations theorists, Bowlby
continued to view anxiety in a relational context. However, for Bowlby, anxiety was not
just a failure of the holding environment; rather, he understood anxiety as an essential
survival instinct shaping the infant-mother relationship. In other words, separation
anxiety is central to survival since it impels the infant to seek its mother for survival at
the same time that it gives rise to the instinct to flee from a perceived threat. Thus,
anxiety has a highly adaptive function within Bowlby’s attachment framework.
In his article “Separation Anxiety,” Bowlby (1960) grounded his theoretical
framework in his observations of children ages 15 to 30 months old who were admitted to
the hospital, separated from their mothers, and cared for by a changing series of nurses.
Over time, these children all displayed a similar set of responses, starting with protest
(crying and upset), then grief and mourning (withdrawal) and finally detachment (a
turning away from human relationships). The first phase in which the child cries for its
mother demonstrates separation anxiety, the second, mourning, and the third, defense.
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While Freud was aware of all of these processes, Bowlby argues that Freud discovered
them in the reverse chronology to the way they actually occur (1960). This made it
difficult for Freud to theorize their connection to each other until the end of his career
when he began to put the pieces together in “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety” (1926).
According to Bowlby, in this late work, Freud finally realized the central etiological role
of separation anxiety in development.
In “Separation Anxiety” (1960), Bowlby summarizes six primary theories of
anxiety including Freud’s and Klein’s and concludes that both of these theories revolve
around attachment. However, Bowlby rejects Klein’s notions of depressive and
persecutory anxiety as well as Freud’s notion of signal anxiety, and asserts that the idea
of “primary anxiety” has the most explanatory power. As Bowlby’s observations of the
infants in the hospital bore out, “the child is bound to his mother by a number of
instinctual response systems, each of which is primary, and which together have high
survival value” (Bowlby, 1960, p. 92). In other words, when the isolated child cries, this
activates clinging and following in order to motivate closeness to the mother. “Pending
this outcome, it is suggested, his subjective experience is that of primary anxiety; when
he is close to her it is one of comfort” (Bowlby, 1960, p. 92). Thus, for Bowlby, primary
anxiety and its attendant instinctual response system is a physiologically-based behavior
pattern bred into the organism through evolution that allows for the attachment between
mother and infant to occur.
Bowlby (1960) further argues that once activated, if the instinctual response meets
some kinds of blockage and cannot reach its termination point, then anxiety is generated.
Thus, if the baby in the hospital cries for its mother, but she does not come, this generates
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separation anxiety and the co-occurring psychological and physiological changes in the
infant. If separation anxiety becomes too great and there is no termination point, this has
a particularly “pathogenic” effect on the infant since he or she is entirely dependent at
this phase life (Bowlby, 1960). Likewise separation engenders fear which is connected to
the fight or flight response. Thus, separation anxiety is “doubly alarming” (Bowlby,
1960, p. 104) for the infant, and this is another reason why he posits that “. . . separation
anxiety is the inescapable corollary of attachment behavior” (1960, p. 102). If anxiety is
inextricable from attachment -- the foundation of human relationships -- can anxiety ever
be a symptom treated independently of other dynamic processes, and can it ever be
eradicated?
In classical theory, object relations, and attachment theory, anxiety is inextricably
bound to human development and survival, and can never be treated as an independent
phenomenon that exists outside of relationships. In recent years, multiple studies have
established a strong correlation between the nature and quality of early and adult
attachment relationships and the susceptibility to and prevalence of mental health
disorders. Thus, as a disorder, anxiety can better be understood within a psychoanalytic
frame as a disturbance in attachment. Viewed through the lens of theorists such as
Bowlby and Winnicott, failures in the caretaking environment lead to psychological and
physiological responses that inform relational patterns and intrapsychic processes that are
now classified as disorders.
The relational focus of attachment theory with its roots in classical theory and
object relations laid the foundation for the interpersonal and relational theorists who
extend these ideas into an increasingly nuanced and complex understanding of psychic
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processes and how they develop both inside and outside the therapeutic relationship.
Several of these theorists, including Harry Stack-Sullivan, Stephen Mitchell and Phil
Bromberg, will be discussed in the next chapter. Ideas about the role of anxiety in the
therapeutic relationship itself as well as notions of self and how that relates to attachment
and anxiety will be further explored as well.
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CHAPTER IV
The Emergence of Relational Theory and Anxiety in a Relational
Context
Introduction
This chapter will continue to examine theoretical formulations of anxiety and the
ways that they have been integrated through relational theory. Paralleling the mid-20th
century development of British object relations and attachment theory, in the United
States, Harry Stack Sullivan developed his theory of interpersonal psychiatry. This
chapter will begin with an examination of some of Sullivan’s central ideas, particularly
concerning the function of anxiety in relationships, a central facet of his theorization. The
chapter will shift focus to contemporary relational theory as outlined by Stephen
Mitchell, and will examine the ways that Mitchell integrates interpersonal theory, object
relations, and attachment theories creating what is now thought of as relational theory.
Finally the chapter will explore Phil Bromberg’s theorization of trauma and dissociated
self-states in conjunction with some of the foundational ideas about trauma articulated by
Judith Herman. Some connections between these theorists and earlier formulations of
anxiety will be explored as well as the question of how anxiety itself becomes part of the
process of therapeutic change within Bromberg’s relational theorization of disassociation
and trauma.
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Interpersonal Theory
. . . .The need for interpersonal security might be said to be the need to be
rid of anxiety. But anxiety is not manageable: It comes by induction from
another person; the infants capacity for manipulating another person is
confined at the very start, to the sole capacity to call out tenderness by
manifesting needs; and the person who would respond to manifest need in
the situation in which the infant is anxious is relatively incapable of that
response because it is the parental anxiety which induces the infant’s
anxiety – and . . . anxiety always interferes with any other tensions with
which it coincides. Therefore, there is, from the very earliest evidence of
the empathic linkage, this peculiar distinction that anxiety is not
manageable (Sullivan, 1953, p.43).

Harry Stack Sullivan, one of the originators of interpersonal psychology, posited
anxiety as the central force mediating relationships. Unlike Freud and early object
relations theorists such as Klein who understood forms of anxiety primarily as innate
intra-psychic processes influenced by relationships with caregivers and the outside world,
Sullivan understood anxiety entirely as a manifestation of interpersonal relationships. As
Greenberg and Mitchell argue, Sullivan’s interpersonal focus marks a paradigm shift
from a drive model and structural theory to a relational focus (1983, p.12). Unlike Freud
who understood development and human motivation as a manifestation of the drives, for
Sullivan human behavior is motivated by needs, satisfaction, and security within
relationships. Sullivan writes,
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whether one is getting more or less anxious is in a large sense the basic
influence which determines interpersonal relations – that is, it is not the
motor, it does not call interpersonal relations into being, but it more or less
directs the course of their development (1953, p. 160).

For Sullivan, structural models of the mind, whether they be through the lens of Freudian
drive theory or object relations theory, were at best an imagined and static rendering of
what he saw as a constantly evolving set of dynamic processes in which the individual
psyche took shape and constantly adapted within an interpersonal field.
Similarly to attachment theorists like Bowlby and self-psychologists like
Winnicott, Sullivan focused on the role of caretakers and the caretaking environment.
However, for Sullivan, anxiety only exists in the interpersonal field between individuals
and is generated by the caretaker; anxiety did not serve an adaptive function, it was not a
signal, a primal instinct or a fear of a previous psychic death; rather anxiety is an affect
passed on to children by their caretakers that serves little function other than to interfere
in the establishment of a pattern of mutually satisfying relationships. According to
Sullivan, the infant’s earliest relation to caregivers is one of need that generates
“tenderness” (Sullivan, 1953, p.40) in a caregiver (what he termed the mothering one)
and the desire to fulfill these needs. Thus, relationships from the outset revolve around
the mutual satisfaction of needs. However, if the caretaker does not meet these needs, or
the caretaker experiences anxiety with regard to these needs, this is passed from caretaker
to infant through “empathic linkage” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 41) and a process of emotional
contagion (Sullivan, 1953, p. 53): a dialectical model in which caregiver anxiety is
transmitted to the infant, and the resulting anxiety in the infant further exacerbates
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caregiver anxiety creating an affective state that is a closed system, with no escape, and
as the opening quote states, no mechanism for management.
The experience of anxiety in relationships over the course of development is
central to the formation of what Sullivan termed the “self-system” (1953, p.109) in
adults, shaped by each individual’s efforts to avoid or to reduce anxiety. Over time,
children adapt their behavior in response to caregiver anxiety, avoiding the behaviors that
exacerbate anxiety and engaging in the ones that reduce it. This process shapes each
person’s self- system, grounded within a set of internalized personifications that take
shape in relationship to caregivers. Sullivan broke these personifications down to three
categories: “Good me,” is the child’s experience of self when their needs are satisfied by
caregiver tenderness and reward. “Bad me,” is the self personification based on
experiences along an “anxiety gradient” in relationship with the “mothering one,” who
reinforces behavior and self experience through forms of mutual acceptance and
disapproval. “Not me” occurs through the experience of intense anxiety in relation to
caregivers and is the basis in Sullivan’s theorization of serious mental disorders such as
schizophrenia (Sullivan, 1953, p.162). Intense anxiety completely obscures the
connection between affective experience and reality, and the person is left in a primitive
state of dread in which affective states cannot be integrated with lived experience.
These personifications based on early experiences with caregivers (not just the
mother) form the self-system and give rise in adults to what Sullivan terms “security
operations” (Sullivan, 1953, p.169). Security operations are the complex processes and
formulations of self that help each individual to minimize anxiety through an illusory
sense of self that allows each person to feel powerful, safe and secure (Mitchell and
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Black, 1995, p. 84). In this regard, security operations are based on a sense of self that
operates outside of conscious awareness, which obscures the original early experiences in
relationships that generated anxiety. Thus, security operations create distortions; past
relational patterns contained in the self-system limit experience and shape current
relationships in ways that prevent the mutual satisfaction of needs. The invisible or
unconscious nature of these operations and how they confine and distort relational
patterns is, for Sullivan, at the heart of the analyst’s work with every patient.
Further breaking with Freudian theory and early objects relations theorists such as
Klein, the analyst in Sullivan’s interpersonal theorization (1953, p. 13) is not a blank
screen, an object, or a site of projective identification, but is part of the interpersonal field
that shapes the self–system from moment to moment. The patient inevitably enacts
security operations rooted in past relationships with the analyst, a conception similar in
some ways to Freud’s idea of transference. However, for Sullivan the analyst was not a
passive recipient of transference but what he called a “participant observer” in the
relational field.
The clinician’s careful attunement to what Sullivan termed the anxiety-empathy
gradient in the relational field (1953, p.160) creates a secure enough environment for the
patient to experience his or her vulnerabilities in relationships, and the ways that
relational patterns designed to avoid or reduce anxiety in the short term, undermine a
greater range of satisfying relational experiences and mutuality in the long run. It is the
analyst’s job to identify the patient’s security operations and underlying self- system in
order to understand the source of anxiety in relationships. The aim is to help the patient
identify self-limiting behaviors and find new more satisfying ways of relating. Thus,
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while the analysts is a participant in the relational field, the analyst, as the word
“observer” implies, always remains in some sense outside the enactment, clarifying the
nature of the patient’s security operations from within their professional role. Mitchell
and Black write:
Sullivan did not regard it as helpful for the analyst to get deeply personally
involved with the patient. The analyst was an expert at interpersonal
relations, and her expert status would keep her from getting drawn into
pathological integrations. . . . The competent analyst would have no strong
or turbulent feelings for the patient (1995, p. 79).
Within this framework, the analyst is a participant in the relational field, but only insofar
as he or she is ultimately an expert guide helping the client through the maze of their selfsystem and security operations. The analyst helps the patient find their way out of an
invisible, closed, anxiety driven relational system into more open terrain where the
patient can relate more freely within a broader, less anxious and more mutually satisfying
interpersonal landscape.
Relational Theory
The paradigm shift that took place in the development of interpersonal theory,
object relations, and attachment theories moving from the intra-psychic and a drive
model, to an understanding of the mind as taking shape and only having meaning within a
relational context, profoundly altered the theory and practice of psychoanalysis in recent
decades. The increasing dyadic emphasis of British object relations theories developed by
Klein, and Fairbairn signaled a shift away from classical theorizations that were almost
exclusively grounded in drive-based intrapsychic processes. Likewise, the emergence of
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attachment theories in England by theorists such as Bowlby, Ainsworth, and Winnicott
marked a shift towards an increasingly dyadic view of development from infancy
onwards.
Paralleling these dyadic developments among English object relations theorists,
Sullivan’s interpersonal ideas of self as a set of illusory dynamic constructions formed to
manage anxiety in relationships (1953), also prefigured the postmodern paradigm shift to
notions of a decentered reality in which all “truth” is conditional and constructed.
Sullivan abhorred static psychiatric claims to authority and its obfuscating language of
mental illness that shaped the treatment of schizophrenics that he witnessed early in his
career. He was equally uncomfortable with the presumptions of structural theory and
object relations as offering “imagined furnishings” of the unconscious (Mitchell and
Greenberg, 1983, p. 104). According to Sullivan, all of these theories utilized language
that suggested certainties where none existed. Despite his attempts to avoid the pitfalls of
theorizing phenomenon that fundamentally defied language, Sullivan’s entire system of
thought is based on a very concrete assumption or truth: namely that anxiety is the
primary affect shaping human development and social interaction. In some respects, like
Freud’s focus on repression or the super-ego within the drive model, the management of
anxiety vis-a-vis the self system has an equally axiomatic and perhaps reductive place
within Sullivan’s interpersonal formulation.
The imperative to legitimate their ideas -- for Freud to make psychoanalysis
scientific, and for Sullivan to do the same with interpersonal psychiatry -- is one way to
understand the focused emphasis of both of these early theorizations. Viewed within the
social, historical, and personal forces of the times in which they lived, both men
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attempted to delineate clear schematic, scientific explanations of what are intangible and
elusive phenomenon. Indeed in Sullivan’s 1948 paper titled “The Meaning of Anxiety in
Psychiatry and Life,” he supplies drawings that render schematic representations of the
personality and the ways that anxiety shapes the relational field. Sullivan writes,
“scientific psychiatry has to be defined as the study of interpersonal relations” (1953, p.
368), a statement that now appears to relational theorists as almost paradoxical in its
aims.
While the pressure for scientific and empirical evidence as the basis for theory
and treatment practices is hardly a relic of the past (as the current dominance of the
“evidence based” medical model makes clear), the relational turn of psychoanalytic
theory in recent decades embraces an increasingly decentered understanding of human
experience, attempting to integrate the claims and ideas of seemingly incompatible or
closed theoretical systems. Stephen Mitchell, in his book Relational Concepts in
Psychoanalysis An Integration (1988), explicitly makes this his primary project. Mitchell
charts the paradigm shift from the one-person drive theory model to the increasingly two
person models beginning with attachment theorists such as Bowlby and object relations
theorists such as Fairbairn, and self-psychologists such as Winnicott. He integrates these
ideas with Harry Stack Sullivan and subsequent interpersonal and relational theorists.
Mitchell understands the monadic emphasis of drive theory as incompatible with
relational views in which the mind is primarily viewed as “interactive” (1988, p. 60). For
this reason, he does not attempt to integrate classical drive theory with relational theory,
but sees it as a “derivative of the interactional field” (Mitchell, 1988, p.61). Mitchell
writes:
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Freud’s system, like all intellectual constructs, has inevitably been
outgrown, but the singularity of his achievement became the model
followed by his successors, who tend to present their contributions not as
partial replacements or solutions to particular features which Freud
addressed, but as alternative, comprehensive systems. Consequently, they
overlook the similarity and compatibility of their efforts and call for
exclusive loyalty, which is neither compelling nor necessary (1988, p.7).

This stated goal of integration frames Mitchell’s project, and throughout his book, he
finds ways to connect interpersonal theory to various object relations theories, as well as
pointing out the differences. Mitchell writes:
I do not believe that interpersonal interactions are merely an “enactment”
of a more psychologically fundamental world of internal object relations
or “representations”; nor do I believe that subjective experience is merely
a recording of actual interpersonal interactions. The most useful way to
view psychological reality is as operating within a relational matrix which
encompasses both intrapsychic and interpersonal realms (1988, p.9).
Where then does his project of integration leave the concept of, and
phenomenological experience of, anxiety within the relational matrix? Although Mitchell
never states this outright, the decentered nature of relational theory makes the
prioritization of one affective state, or even a focus on its definition and treatment
irrelevant, since anxiety cannot be defined as a phenomenon outside the relational matrix.
However, it is useful here to look at some of the ways that he integrates different
theoretical approaches already discussed in this thesis in order to understand how these
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formulations of anxiety inform relational theory. In this regard, it can also be argued that
relational concepts are less a theory in their own right, and more an integration of
previous ideas, an overarching approach to psychoanalytic theory and practice that
encompasses to a greater extent, the full complexity of psychological experience.
Mitchell begins his theoretical integration with a discussion of frameworks that he
labels “relational by design” (1988, p. 21) including Bowlby’s attachment theory which
posits the infant’s relationship with the mother as a survival mechanism that is
genetically encoded. As noted in the previous chapter, separation anxiety was, in
Bowlby’s model, the corollary of attachment behavior. In this respect, attachment is a
primary instinct that does not rely on relatedness from the outset, and as such, is
consistent with Freudian ideas of drive that are derivative of Darwinian theory. However,
Bowlby’s attachment theory also gestures toward the dyadic nature of infant development
that sees interaction as an end in its own right, not a means of “gratifying or channeling
something else” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 24) as it is in drive theory.
Mitchell (1988) further points out that current infancy research increasingly
suggests that rather than being an instinct that predates perception, attachment is from the
outset very much connected to the experience in relationship with a particular person, and
that the infant perceives far more from very early on than was previously understood. Put
simply, infants are complexly relational from the outset and not just governed by primary
instincts. Bowlby’s emphasis on separation anxiety, the cornerstone of his attachment
theory that distinguished him from Freud’s idea of the object, can now be understood
within a relational context as the attachment to a particular person or people and all the
complexity this entails. Within this framework, separation anxiety is only one
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phenomenological experience amidst the multiplicity of relational experiences that
defines infants and primary caregivers.
A similar analysis also clarifies Sullivan’s conception of anxiety in the
interpersonal field. Sullivan’s focus on essential human needs, the satisfaction of these
needs, and the ways this connects infants and caretakers, locates him, along with Bowlby,
in Mitchell’s relational by design grouping. While Sullivan abandons Freud’s reliance on
drives as a primary motivation in human psychology, he replaces this with the
interpersonal experience of the anxiety gradient; the need to avoid or reduce anxiety in
the relational field. Ideally, relationships that are solely mutually satisfying without the
intrusion of anxiety are possible, but the empathic linkage complicates this ideal, and
creates what Sullivan called “problems with living” (1953. P.4) Thus, even as Sullivan
argues that people only develop in relation to others and that notions of the self are in fact
systematized illusions based on past relational patterns, the experience of anxiety remains
the dominant affect shaping relationships. Relational design for Sullivan implies an
opposite design flaw in the form of anxiety.
Mitchell labels his next grouping, “relational by intent” (1988, p. 26), and focuses
his attention on Fairbairn’s explanation for individual attachment to bad objects as a way
to explain what Freud called the repetition compulsion of destructive or masochistic
relationships and behaviors. Fairbairn argued that humans hold onto bad objects as an
attempt to remain connected to their caregivers in the only ways that were available to
them as infants and children (Mitchell, 1988). Mitchell writes that:
Fairbairn regards object seeking as innate, and his approach is closely
related to Bowlby’s notion of attachment. Bowlby portrays attachment as
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an automatic mechanism, the product of instinctive, reflexive behavioral
subsystems. . . . Fairbairn adds a consideration of intention and emotional
presence or absence and thereby highlights the longing, the hunger for
contact and connection, that propels human relationships (1988, p. 28).

Mitchell argues that this complements Sullivan’s idea of relational by design in which the
child’s innate needs, and not so much his intent, draw him or her into relatedness with
others. Similarly to Sullivan, Fairbairn’s notion of loss of connection to bad internal
objects and the fear of being alone in the world can also be understood as a way that
anxiety experienced in past relationships generates the repetition of destructive or
pathological relational patterns in order to preserve existing patterns of connection with
primary caregivers.
Mitchell also understands Klein in a relational context that he includes as
relational by intent. Although Klein firmly grounded infant development in the drives and
annihilation anxiety, persecution anxiety, and the anxiety and guilt produced by the
ambivalence of the depressive position, Mitchell (1988) argues that Klein’s theorization
can be read outside the realm of fantasy and drive. He translates Klein’s idea of
reparation and gratitude versus envious spoiling and manic triumph into a more relational
context that is similar in thrust to Fairbairn. He writes:
The urge for reparation can be understood as emerging not as a reaction to
fantasized damage, but to the other’s real sufferings and characteristic
pathology. . . . Envious spoiling can be understood not as an excess of
constitutional aggression, but as an attempt to escape from the painful
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position of loving and desiring a largely absent or damaged parent, or,
particularly, an inconsistent parent (Mitchell, 1988, p. 29).

Notwithstanding Klein’s fantasy framework of powerful affects attached to objects,
Klein’s infant develops in relationship with real caregivers who either reduce anxiety and
the aggressive drives through loving object experiences or who heighten the defenses and
destructive affects that underlie both the paranoid schizoid position and the depressive
position. The emphasis of Klein’s primitive anxieties and powerful affects are, from a
relational perspective, shaped by distinct primary relationships.
Mitchell’s last theoretical grouping within the relational matrix, he labels
“relational by implication” (1988, p. 29). He includes Winnicott and Kohut in this
category and argues that the development of a sense of self that is central to both these
theorists occurs in relationship to others, particularly primary caregivers. Winnicott’s
almost exclusive focus on the holding environment created by the mother is the necessity
for the emergence of a “solid sense of self as the central achievement of normal early
development . . . .The capacity to experience and hold onto a sense of one’s own being as
real depends on the mother’s doing so first, mirroring back to the child who he is and
what he is like” (Mitchell, 1988, p.31). Although Mitchell does not address Winnicott’s
fear of breakdown as a central experience in mental illness, past experience of psychic
death in relationships that underlies this fear suggests a fear of fragmentation in which the
infant’s or child’s sense of self is damaged through an inadequate or destructive
caretaking environment.
Sullivan’s self-system comprised of illusory personifications of self is strikingly
similar to Winnicott’s notion of the false self that takes shape in negating and pathogenic
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caretaking environments. It could also be argued that Winnicott’s fear of breakdown
bears a strong theoretical resonance with the splitting that occurs in Klein’s paranoid
schizoid position and the ways that pathogenic care heightens annihilation anxiety.
Psychic deaths that occurred in infancy and early childhood are covered over by a false
self, or (understood in the multiplicity of the relational context) false selves are a product
of experiences of intense anxiety in relationships that Sullivan labels with the selfpersonification of “not me” (1953, p.161). While these ways of connecting theoretical
constructions of anxiety and its role in psychological development are mine not
Mitchell’s, the integration of these conceptions of anxiety that are central to what are
usually framed as complete theoretical systems that must stand alone, is only made
possible by the decentered orientation of relational theory.
Within the relational matrix, the phenomenon of anxiety and its various
theoretical formulations are not necessarily incompatible. While there is no attempt in
Mitchell’s book to define anxiety or to pin down its role in relationships and the
functioning of the human mind, the word “anxiety” and its implied meanings grounded in
previous theoretical formulations, remain an important conceptual and linguistic referent
in Mitchell’s discussions. In his description of the way that each person is embedded in
his or her relational matrix, Mitchell writes:
The prolonged condition of childhood dependency makes the discovery
and forging of reliable points of connection not just an emotional necessity
but an apparent condition for physical survival. . . . One’s condition can
never be taken for granted. One is always in some ultimate sense at the
mercy of adults. The parents can never be purely facilitative, simply
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allowing the child to find his or her own path. The anxieties inherent in
childhood make it necessary for the child to employ the parents as specific
points of reference, their idiosyncrasies becoming anchors for all
subsequent joinings (1988, p. 276).

A closer reading of the language and conceptual content in this passage illustrates the
ways that relational theory integrates previous theories to create a new paradigm. Indeed
what is most striking about this passage is the range of ideas that it draws upon. The
reference to “physical survival” is suggestive of the Darwinian primary instincts that
undergird Bowlby’s attachment framework. “The prolonged condition of childhood
dependency” implies the fundamental needs that create mutuality between infants and
caregivers in Sullivan’s interpersonal theory. The notion that parents can never be
“purely facilitative” references Winnicott’s holding environment as the condition for the
formation of a sense of self while “[t]he anxieties inherent in childhood,” undermine the
notion that such a preformed environment can exist. Yet this phrase also reaches still
farther back to Freud’s idea of signal anxiety and its ubiquitous role in development, and
likewise resonates with the profound anxieties that structure Klein’s stages of childhood
development. Finally the word “idiosyncratic” in the last sentence of the paragraph,
locates individual human experience outside the reach of any theory, stressing instead the
unique relational matrix that shapes every person. While theoretical orthodoxy and any
notion of scientific accuracy are discarded by the end of the paragraph, what emerges is a
much more complex vision of human experience and the ways that individual psychology
emerges and finds expression in relationships.
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At the end of his project of integration, the final chapter of Mitchell’s book

focuses on the analytic process itself and how change is facilitated through the
therapeutic action within the relational matrix between analyst and patient. Mitchell
(1988) points out that every theoretical stance generates a different set of questions and
narratives, which influence the nature of the analytic action. However, in a relational
approach, the analyst is not positioned, as in classical theory, outside the relational
matrix. Nor is he a participant observer acting as an expert guide through anxiety, or
offering a needed corrective of what was missed or damaged in childhood, as is the case
in interpersonal theory and self psychology. Instead the analyst works from:
within the structures and strictures of the repetitive configurations of the
analysand’s relational matrix. The struggle to find his way out, the
collaborative effort of analyst and analysand to observe and understand
these configurations and to discover other channels through which to
engage each other, is the crucible of analytic change” (Mitchell, 1988, p.
292).
The nature of being “embedded” is for the analyst “ ‘relatively uncontrolled at the
experiential level’ ” (1988, p. 293) and in this respect is not fundamentally theory driven.
This is not a license for the analyst to do whatever they want in session, but it implies that
the analysand’s experience in relationship with the analyst is itself the primary action for
change; interpretation, affect, language, tone, and non verbal expression are all integral
parts of this process.
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The Relational Matrix, Dissociation, and Multiple Self-States
The contemporary relational psychoanalytic theorist, Phil Bromberg, extended

both Sullivan’s and Winnicott’s ideas to encompass a greater range of expression than
good, bad, and not me or a false self. Bromberg locates the idea for multiple self-states in
Winnicott’s introduction to classical psychoanalysis of the idea of the decentered self
(1998). Expanding upon Sullivan’s early formulations of a decentered self (good, bad and
not me), Bromberg writes that:
unless the concept of self-dynamism is revived and synthesized with a
developmental evolution of “personifications” which is broader in scope,
it will be extremely difficult to develop interpersonal theory beyond the
point of seeing the “self” simply as an “anxiety-gating” mechanism with
only ambiguous theoretical linkage to how it undergoes representational
change in psychoanalysis. (1998, p. 40)
In this passage, Bromberg challenges Sullivan’s idea that personifications take shape
solely in response to anxiety in relationship. Here Bromberg alludes to what in his later
work he calls dissociated self-states. For Bromberg, self-representation cannot be reduced
to a few categories such as good me, bad me or not me, nor could the self’s only function
be the management of anxiety in past and current relationships including the analytic one.
Instead Bromberg argues that each person is composed of multiple self-states.
Dissociation serves an adaptive or healthy function enabling their coexistence, yet
allowing one or the other to come to the fore in order to enhance the ego’s integrating
function of the infinite variety of stimuli presented by daily existence. In this formulation,
dissociation, much like Bowlby’s conception of attachment, is an adaptive function
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necessary for survival; it only becomes a pathogenic process when self states are
fragmented to the degree that one is completely unknowable or lacks any cohesion with
the others undermining “an overarching cognitive and experiential state felt as ‘me’”
(Bromberg, 1998, p. 273).
The experience of a unitary coherent self is also a necessary “adaptive illusion”
created by the ability to dissociate self-states (Bromberg, 1998, p.273). It is only when
this “adaptive illusion of unity is traumatically threatened with unavoidable, precipitous
disruption that it becomes, in itself a liability because it is in jeopardy of being
overwhelmed by input it cannot process. . . .” (Bromberg, 1998, p.273). Thus,
paradoxically for Bromberg, “when the illusion of unity is too dangerous to be
maintained there is then a return to the simplicity of dissociation as a proactive, defensive
response to the potential repetition of trauma (1998, p.273).”
At the same time that Bromberg challenges the clinical utility of Sullivan’s idea
of a self-system developed to manage anxiety, Bromberg embraces Sullivan’s view of the
empathy anxiety gradient as an apt way to understand what other theorists call the
analytic holding environment. The interpersonal field between analyst and patient offers a
pre-syntactic opportunity to access experiences that are beyond rational thought. Thus,
Bromberg asserts:
it is not simply a matter of getting the patient to confront unconscious,
repressed, dissociated or un-attended data. To do so may or may not create
useful behavioral change, but it will not in itself lead to representational
restructuralization. What keeps preconceptual . . . experience so rigidly
unyielding is that the “me-you” representation is organized around
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elements which are more powerful than the evidence of reason (1998,
p.49).

He extends Sullivan’s idea of the interpersonal field to include an analytic
relationship that fosters access to pre-syntactic self-states that are beyond memory
or reason. Another way to say this is that Bromberg is embracing the notion that
the patient analyst relationship offers elements of a new more secure attachment
that helps the patient affectively not just cognitively restructure self-experience.
Yet this new attachment relationship must also make the patient uncomfortable
enough, or generate enough anxiety that the patient’s defenses can be experienced
and articulated at the same time that the patient takes in the moment by moment
soothing presence of the analyst. In so doing, the door is opened for the patient to
experience self-states dissociated through trauma without becoming so
threatening to the illusion of a unitary self that the patient is unable to tolerate the
process.
The conception of psychoanalytic action in this passage resonates with Mitchell’s
idea of embeddedness and the ways that all facets of the relationship with the analyst
become the basis for change. Trauma, in the sense that Bromberg uses it, is any
subjective experience that threatens a unitary sense of self, which then activates defensive
dissociative processes. This psychoanalytic theorization of trauma mirrors the DSM’s
definition of PTSD symptomology as one most often characterized by dissociation. Jon
Allen writes that “clients with a diagnosis of PTSD have a high likelihood of being
diagnosed with a dissociative disorder and vice versa” (2001, p.168).
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In Judith Herman’s seminal work on trauma, she writes that “The conflict

between the will to deny psychological events and the will to proclaim them aloud is the
central dialectic of psychological trauma. . . . . The psychological distress of traumatized
people simultaneously calls attention to the existence of an unspeakable secret and
deflects attention from it” (1992, p. 1). Hermann further writes that these alterations in
consciousness in traumatized people are what professionals call “dissociation.” While
Herman explores many different forms of trauma from sexual abuse to the atrocities of
war, there exists in all of them the tension of the spoken and unspoken; put another way,
what can be incorporated into the illusion of a unitary self, to borrow Bromberg’s idea,
whether that be individual or the collective memory of a an entire group, or whether that
history must be kept silent, split off through defensive processes of individual and or
group dissociation. Of course individual history cannot be separated from History in the
broader sense, and often the trauma and dissociation in one mirrors the needs and
imperatives of the other.
While trauma can be thought of as linked to an event or a series of events, trauma
can also be understood as a subjective experience in which a similar event or series of
events may affect different individuals in different ways. Thus, what may be experienced
as a threat to a unitary self and dissociated or kept secret by one individual can be
integrated by another. Here Winnicott’s notion of a “fear of breakdown” (1963) is useful.
Impingements in the caregiving environment or what he might call psychic deaths that
already have occurred are dissociated and avoided for fear of breakdown. The subjective
experience of anxiety can be so great that it leads to fragmentation, or in Bromberg’s
view, a unity of experience too traumatic to incorporate.
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In an attachment framework, instinctual anxiety always predates trauma, but

perhaps it is the quality of the attachment itself that makes individuals more or less
susceptible to later trauma. Numerous recent studies have documented the connection
between attachment style and susceptibility to symptoms of trauma such as anxiety and
depression. Thus, in a contemporary trauma framework, anxiety is a common symptom
of trauma. However, as Freud and Bowlby argue, anxiety also serves numerous adaptive
functions. Trauma can derail these functions leaving the traumatized individual in state of
anxiety with no termination point.
Psychoanalytic theorizations of anxiety and its functions from Freud to
contemporary relational and trauma theory offer a multifaceted understanding of anxiety
beyond the medical recognition of it as a symptom to be treated. Indeed anxiety within a
psychoanalytic frame is not a disorder. It is indispensible to survival and an important
component of treatment, without which growth and the restructuring of selfrepresentation could not be possible. Psychodynamic psychotherapy offers a unique
relational space in which the client can ultimately experience multiple self-states and yet
over time retain their sense of unity. This is made possible by the safety of the attachment
relationship between clinician and client, in which the termination of anxiety can only be
found in seeking out and strengthening that connection.
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CHAPTER V
Discussion

In the following composite case discussion, I hope to illustrate the ways that a
relational approach can offer a comprehensive and effective way to conceptualize and to
treat a patient experiencing anxiety. I also will use several classical object relations and
interpersonal theories previously discussed in order to further illustrate them and to
explicate this case. I purposely chose a case that is not emblematic of any one “anxiety
disorder” in order to offer a counterpoint to the medical model. Like all patients, D’s case
is unique. But it is also representative of a large proportion of students I saw throughout
the year at the college counseling center where I did my field work, students who
presented with general anxiety, social anxiety, and panic attacks, often co-existing. In this
respect, D’s case captures the ubiquitous experience of anxiety, particularly within the
18-25 year old college population, the age group with the highest rate of onset of what
are understood and treated within the medical model as isolated anxiety disorders. I also
hope this case raises more questions about how anxiety manifests and functions intrapsychically and interpersonally within a systemic context and how anxiety can be an
integral part of the treatment process when using a relational approach.
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Introduction
D began individual therapy with me at the start of the academic year. From the
outset, he had what I can only describe as an anxious presentation. He sat on the edge of
his chair, and very rarely leaned back, his small athletic build taut with energy. While D
was articulate, and I immediately liked him, he spoke rapidly, leaving few silences, as if
words were a way of staying aloft, like a dragonfly who will crash if it stops flapping its
wings. He spoke at length about what he did or thought, but very rarely about what he
felt. D was born in the US to parents who emigrated from Morocco in order to attend
college, and he spoke fluent Arabic. He had black hair, dark brown almond shaped eyes,
and light tan skin. In the context in which we met, I would not have known his ethnicity
by his appearance alone.
D’s presenting concern was social anxiety that led to an experience of isolation at
college. When he first came in for treatment, D was “hiding in his room” feeling as
though he did not know what to say to other students, a seemingly paradoxical experience
for someone who spoke so much in session. He also recently broke up with a girlfriend
he met at college, which left him feeling further isolated and anxious. His girlfriend told
him that interacting with him was like “talking with a stone” since he rarely expressed
emotion. D also experienced anxiety around his schoolwork that led him to procrastinate
and to underachieve in his own eyes. He had what he described as occasional anxiety
attacks in class when his heart started racing and he sweat profusely.
D’s family had moved a number of times during his childhood -- from the West
Coast back to Morocco for two years when D was a toddler, and then returning to the US
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where they moved several more times before finally settling in the Midwest. His family
moved often enough that eventually he stopped trying to connect more intimately with
peers. D described himself as “not letting himself get too attached” to any friends.
Throughout his childhood, D did well in school, and spent much of his time alone on the
computer, either playing games or experimenting with web design and programming.
Though small in stature, D was good runner on his high school team.
During D’s junior year of high school, his parents separated, and his father
returned to Morocco, where he remained. This separation was very upsetting for D, and
he continued to struggle from the fallout when we met. D described his parents as having
an unhappy marriage in which they were in constant disagreement over where the family
should reside. D’s mother found work as a librarian in the US, but his father never found
meaningful work. D characterized his father as an unhappy man who only took on
intermittent, part time menial jobs. The family moved as his mother pursued better
paying librarian jobs to support them, a situation that further undermined what D
described as his father’s understanding of himself as “traditional Muslim man who is
head of the family.” D’s father never settled into their life in the US and often spoke of
his desire to return to Morocco to be with and care for his extended family in the town
where he grew up. D’s mother, on the other hand, had no interest in returning and wanted
to remain in the US so that her children could take advantage of the educational
opportunities here. With this fundamental conflict structuring the marriage, D grew up
feeling as though he did not want to “add any more worries” to an already stressful
situation. He “kept his head down” and did his schoolwork. Further into our therapy, he
spoke of the way that the stress and unhappiness between his parents, and the lack of

	
  

61	
  

communication and emotional connection in the family, became so “familiar to him” that
he is not sure what he felt as he was growing up. Indeed this was a common theme that
surfaced throughout our work together: often D did not know what he felt outside of an
experience of anxiety, and if he had some awareness of his affects, it was difficult for him
to communicate them.
A consideration of intra-psychic and interpersonal theories within a relational
treatment
While I agree with Mitchell’s assertion that the monadic and intra-psychic
emphasis of Freudian theory makes it difficult if not impossible to integrate it with the
dyadic focus of relational theory, aspects of Freud’s conception of anxiety as a signal
offer a useful entry point for this case. Through a Freudian lens, D’s anxiety can be
understood as a signal for repression as a primary defense. However, D did not repress
his drives or his id impulses. Rather repression acted as a defense against the experience
and expression of affect within his formative relationships and within a broader social
context.
As our work together proceeded, D became increasingly able to articulate how
difficult it was for him as a child growing up around the uncertainty and tension within
his parent’s marriage. After a time, D admitted that he resented his father for his
“unwillingness” to adapt to life in the US, and he felt sorry for his mother who was left
largely responsible for the family’s emotional and financial well being. Furthermore, D
described his father’s unhappiness and diminished self–esteem within their home as part
of a broader discomfort within the cultural and social practices here in the US, many of
which conflicted with what D described as his father’s “religious upbringing.” Already a
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quiet man by temperament, his father became increasingly marginal over the years. It
might be said that his father’s experience in his family became a parallel process for his
experience of displacement and marginalization on multiple levels within the US. His
experience can also be understood as racial melancholia, a kind of extended mourning for
all that was lost in the process of immigrating to a predominantly white western culture
(Eng and Han, 2000). D said that this situation made his father very short tempered with
D and his brother, two years his junior. D’s brother also struggled academically. This
generated more pressure on D to reduce the level of stress in the family. On the rare
occasion when D expressed any unhappiness to or with his parents, it only increased his
father’s anger and the conflict between his parents. As he got older, communication with
his mother often led to judgments and coercion by her if D held different points of view
or expressed emotions that did not make sense to her. Understood within this very basic
outline of D’s relational, cultural, and socio-economic matrix, the experience and
expression of affect became unsafe, a source of anxiety, that further threatened the
somewhat tenuous stability of his family’s life in the US. Thus, it can be argued that
repression served an adaptive function in relationships, and D’s anxiety, from a Freudian
perspective, constantly signaled the ego’s activation of this defense.
While Sullivan (1953) eschewed Freud’s structural model of the mind, Freud’s
(1926) later notion of the way anxiety functions resonates in many ways with Sullivan’s
interpersonal perspective. Within an interpersonal framework, D’s self-security system
developed in order to reduce his experience of anxiety in relationships. For D, “good me”
might be the son who did his schoolwork and contained his emotions in order to embody
his parent’s needs and expectations of him. While “bad me” might be the son who
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complained or got angry or sad, the son who felt responsible for his parents’ conflicts as a
couple and in some ways for their individual unhappiness. The daily anxiety that D
experienced at college might then be understood as his self-security system whereby
limiting his social interactions and an anxious focus on schoolwork repeated the same
security operations for managing anxiety that he used while at home. These attempts to
reduce anxiety functioned largely outside conscious awareness, leading him to feel
isolated and anxious without any apparent explanation in the present. Indeed upon
entering therapy, D stated that there was no good reason for him to feel so anxious in the
present at college, and in this respect, his “security operations” created mild dissociative
states, or what might also be called temporal dislocations within his self-experience. This
apparent disjuncture is part of what led D to seek out therapy even as he avoided or
“repressed” affective expression in his daily life.
A Kleinian object relations frame regarding affective development raises the
important question of what happens when powerful affects such as love and hate are not
more fully experienced and expressed. D’s internalization of his own parents as both
caring, “good objects” and as vulnerable or punishing people --“bad objects”-- who could
not tolerate affect left him in a position of trying to adapt himself to repair them, or at the
very least, trying to avoid pushing them further apart. For Klein (1952), love and hate are
derivative of the libidinal and aggressive drives, and are therefore universal. However,
while affects and certain relational processes of rupture and repair may appear
“universal,” the meaning of love and hate and how they structure relationships is not.
Like all affective phenomenon, the meaning and experience of love and hate is
subjective, and how they are understood and expressed in relationships is culturally and
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socioeconomically contingent. In this regard, D’s father’s return to Morocco to be with
his extended family was, according to D, an expression of love and belonging within his
father’s belief system, even as he left the nuclear family that Americans tend to prioritize.
Yet D was also profoundly hurt and angered by his father’s unwillingness to adapt to
American life for the sake of his nuclear family, a choice that D said he did not want to
reproduce in his own life. It was not until the final weeks of our work together that D
expressed a greater range of affect about his family and his father in particular.
Within a Kleinian formulation, it can be argued that D engaged in forms of
splitting characteristic of the paranoid schizoid phase in which powerful affects cannot be
integrated or experienced in relationship to the same objects. While I am not suggesting
that D’s has a ‘schizoid’ personality or emotional make-up primarily rooted in early
traumas in the caretaking environment, Klein’s theorizations (1952) also argue that
splitting and other schizoid defenses are an integral part of both ‘pathogenic’ and
‘normative’ development, and these defenses continue to function in all people, to a
greater or lesser extent over the life course. Viewed through this lens, D’s inability to
express hate (or perhaps more accurately, anger) toward his father and in relation to his
own experience of abandonment, can be viewed as a kind of splitting wherein his father,
the loved object is protected from D’s anger and or “hate.” These split and disavowed
affects are then projected onto his father and the rest of the world and then, according to
Klein’s circular processes, introjected, thereby heightening D’s annihilation and
persecution anxiety in relationships; a formulation that helps explain the degree of D’s
social anxiety, and his recurring fear that other’s were angry with him or did not like him
that arose throughout our work together.
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Just as D split or disavowed hateful affects, he also disavowed powerful feelings

of love and desire. While he experienced himself as having these feelings (for example in
relation to his ex-girlfriend), others, including myself, often experienced him as flat or
inexpressive. Rather than integrating and expressing these affects, D projected and
introjected them creating the relational dynamics in which D tried to meet the needs and
desires of others, whether that be his parents, his girlfriend or me, but did not fully
experience and express his own desires and or loving feelings. Whenever D’s defensive
processes for managing and splitting “loving” as well as “hateful” affects was threatened,
the possibility of further integration itself became a source of anxiety. Thus, D “kept his
head down,” and did not clearly express his needs or desires at home, just as later in
therapy -- as the next section will clarify -- he was unable to fully express his needs and
desires with me.
On a number of occasions, D also worried that he would become like his father –disconnected from others, angry and alone -- and in this regard splitting and projection
also protected D’s ego in the inevitable process of identification that takes place between
parents and children, and fathers and sons in particular; by protecting (his father) from his
anger and or hate as well as love, D also split these affects from himself, protecting
himself as a he grew into a man, from the “hated” father who is also part of him. The
cyclical patterns of projection and introjection that structure relational patterns from the
outset are part of the processes of identification, which continue to occur throughout all
development. However, as with the use of Freud’s theorization of anxiety in a relational
context, D’s affects are not derivative of libidinal or aggressive drives, but are only
experienced within a relational matrix that is contextually shaped and bound. D tried to
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understand the cultural and familial expectations that helped shape his father’s idea of
relationships and the affects that structured them, but D grew up within a different
cultural context than his father, one that realigned his emotional and relational priorities
in a way that complicated his identifications with his father. In this regard, the concepts
of splitting and projection can only be understood as part of the complex ways that D
straddled two worlds, growing up in a very different context from either his mother or
father.
While Klein and Sullivan offer useful lenses for understanding anxiety in this
case, both theories clearly have their limitations. To speak of D as having a good or bad
self or to speak of D’s intra-psychic experience in object relational terms, as being
composed of good and bad objects is unnecessarily reductive. After all, what is a “good”
or “bad” self or object, and what do these words even mean to the person in treatment.
While Sullivan embraced the decentered idea that a unitary self was a necessary illusion,
the very idea that this illusion can be broken down into categories of good and bad is also
an illusion. From a relational perspective, a closer approximation of the “truth” is to say
that D learned and internalized a set of patterns within the particular relational matrix of
his family and these in turn exist in a dialectic with his own intra-psychic processes.
Mitchell writes that he uses the term:
‘relational matrix’ in an effort to transcend the unfortunate tendency to
dichotomize concepts like interpersonal relations and ‘object’ relations, or
the interpersonal and intrapsychic, as if a focus on either side necessarily
implies a denial or deemphasis of the other . . . .The most useful way to
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view psychological reality is as operating within a relational matrix which
encompasses both intrapsychic and interpersonal realms (1988, p.9).
However, a focus on interpersonal relationships and intra-psychic processes that

does not understand them within a broader socio-economic and cultural context is also
limited and distorting. D’s family, like every family, was decidedly shaped by their social
status within a given context. Their particular experiences of immigration and the
economic, social, and cultural forces with which they contended as they sought to build
their life in the US and how these forces interacted with the relational patterns and social
contexts that predated their immigration – all of these forces create the decentered
“truths” that various theories attempt to organize. While this last point may seem selfevident, a relational focus as articulated by Mitchell can obscure that family only exists
within an infinitely complex dialectic with other systems. In this regard, the various
manifestations of D’s anxiety are inextricably interwoven with the larger socioeconomic
and cultural systems of which he and his family are a part. While the idea of a nuclear
family suggests a core around which everything else orbits, the relational matrix in the
most complex sense is more like a set of crosshatched lines and shapes moving in all
directions, both familiar and perplexing, a Jackson Pollack painting in which the analyst
and analysand work together to discern patterns and meanings.
These overarching theoretical considerations point to the question Bromberg
(1998) raises in his critique of Sullivan’s personifications. No matter how we frame or
populate a patient’s intra-psychic landscape through classical and object relations theory,
and no matter the degree to which we try to maintain some objectivity as participant
observers within an interpersonal approach, this central question remains: How does the
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self or for the purposes of this discussion, D’s self-experience, particularly with anxiety,
undergo representational change within treatment, and what creates the therapeutic
action? The section that follows explores the ways that D and I grew together as our
relationship itself increasingly became the vehicle for change.
Like the discussion of every individual with whom we work, the frameworks I use
so far in this discussion generate a particular set of meanings that inevitably prioritize
and/or exclude other information and meanings. Likewise, the focus on anxiety as a
phenomenon as well as the use of theories that are not fundamentally dyadic generate
their own tone and emotional tenor in the writing itself. While I tried throughout the
previous section of this discussion to retain the integrity of D’s presentation as
understood through my own limited subjectivity, the largely monadic theoretical focus of
the previous discussion creates a tone that is more “analytic” and removed than
collaborative. Rather than edit this to produce writing that might be more reflective of my
own relational and inter-subjective experience of treatment, I think it is equally important
and instructive to try to capture the ways that different theoretical orientations not only
shape the therapeutic relationship, but the writing about that relationship as well. A
monadic approach and even Sullivan’s less removed but professionalized and “empirical”
participant observer create what can only be called expert distance since the analyst must
remain outside of their client’s experience to some degree in order to treat them. It is also
possible that D’s lack of affective expression at various points in our work together, finds
a parallel representational process in this writing.
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The embedded analyst and attachment
D and I met weekly throughout the fall semester. We often spoke of his

relationship with his ex-girlfriend who also lived on campus. They had been a couple
throughout freshman and sophomore years. This relationship was the most intimate
connection D ever made. Yet in the final months of the relationship, they often fought
about D’s lack of emotional expression. She began to feel that he did not really love her,
even though from his perspective, he felt as though he gave her a lot. D bought a car with
money he made over the summer, and he drove his girlfriend everywhere. They ate all of
their meals together, and if she needed any help when she was overwhelmed with
schoolwork, D was always ready to lend a hand doing whatever was needed whether it
was laundry or shopping. She accepted this help and care, and yet she said she did not
feel loved. D began to resent her for all that he gave her and her lack of appreciation,
while she felt increasingly disconnected from him.
As we explored what happened in this relationship, D and I discovered that there
were many things he felt in relation to his girlfriend, but he was so anxious about
expressing himself that he either lost track of his emotions in her presence or became
paralyzed, unable to express them. Despite his trouble communicating, he did not
understand how the things he did for her did not adequately express his commitment and
love. As we continued to meet over the fall semester, D began to regret that he did not
express himself more fully with her. He still ran into her on campus and they spoke, but
he remained too anxious to disclose more to her. In the context of this relationship, we
began to talk about the ways that love in his family was expressed through sacrifice and
fulfilling obligations, as his mother had sacrificed for him and his brother, and his father
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sacrificed for his extended family. In his effort to avoid becoming like his father and
mother, D assiduously attended to his girlfriends needs to demonstrate his commitment to
“making things work.” Often as D spoke of his girlfriend and the ways his relationship
reminded him of patterns in his own family, his voice would occasionally quiver, or his
eyes would grow moist. When I pointed these things out to him, D initially became selfconscious since he was unaware of them. Usually he would cough or run his hands over
his face as if to wipe away whatever was there, and would shift the tack of our
conversation to another subject. However, as D and I got to know each other better and
established increasing trust, I began to ask him what it was like for him in the moment to
share his emotions with me. While this question initially appeared to make D anxious,
over the course of the semester he began to feel that this was a new and valuable
experience for him.
This process can be understood as an embodiment of what Sullivan called the
empathy anxiety gradient between patient and therapist (1953). Expressing and
experiencing affective states that D usually avoided increased his anxiety, but not to the
degree that that therapy itself became unsafe for D, threatening what Winnicott (1963)
called the therapeutic holding environment.
Paul Wachtel (2011) theorizes this process in therapy as a form of exposure. He
writes:
In the process of promoting insight, or interpreting (and hence
interrupting) defenses that keep the patient out of touch with his
experience, a successful psychodynamic therapy brings the patient into
closer contact with the experiences that have been warded off. The patient
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thinks the thoughts and feels the feelings that he previously avoided – or
put differently he is exposed to them. . . . Interpretation and selfknowledge do contribute to the process, but something else that is very
important is also involved. The process of change proceeds to a significant
degree through direct experience. . . . What we know about exposure as a
general process suggests that usually it is necessary for the patient to
experience repeated exposure for the anxiety to begin to significantly
diminish (Wachtel, 2011, p.11).

Early in his career, Wachtel worked closely with cognitive behavioral therapists, and he
views exposure as a methodology common to both psychodynamic therapy and CBT,
suggesting that the theoretical boundaries dividing different practices are not as rigid as
they appear. While I consciously used elements of CBT with a couple of other patients
experiencing anxiety, I did not do so with D. However, Wachtel’s description of the
process of exposure and therapeutic change aptly describes some of the key elements that
occurred with D. As we continued our work together and D was repeatedly exposed to
affects that he previously avoided, these parts of himself became more integrated into his
self-experience, reducing his anxiety around their expression. It is useful to point out here
that the splitting of powerful affects that define Klein’s schizoid phase are further
integrated by the ego though an empathy anxiety gradient around affective expression
that also occurs over time in the therapeutic process. (Again, the organizing frame of
intrapsychic processes can usefully be understood within a relational matrix and not as
drive derivatives.)
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At the outset of Wachtel’s article, he explicitly writes about the difference

between writing about therapy as if looking down on a landscape from “30,000 feet”
where the “contours” of the relationship are “easy to grasp” in contrast to the actual
experience of doing therapy -- the view from “ground level” in which the experience is
far more complicated, “unpredictable” and “confusing” (2011, p.3). If this is not
occurring, than something important is in fact missing from therapy. The process of
writing about D or any individual in treatment inherently imposes a retroactive order and
meaning that is not wholly consistent with the embedded and often confusing nature of
the therapeutic process itself. Wachtel provides transcriptions of his sessions so that the
reader can see the therapy from ground level “warts and all” (2011, p.3). There is not the
room here to do this, nor does a composite case study make this possible. More
importantly, transcriptions and language alone cannot capture the experiential nature of
therapy. Along with language, therapy is transacted through the body, through presyntactic non-verbal communication, and an experience of empathic connection that
language can only grasp at. Thus, no representation can ever really be at ground level,
and though I strive in this section to capture the collaborative quality and texture of the
relational matrix in therapy, this discussion is at best an approximation of experience.
As I sat in session with D, at times I found myself feeling uncharacteristically
tired and a little removed. D’s s rapid, concrete, and anxious style of communicating
carried me along on what I came to think of as a kind of ride on a raft above constantly
moving waters in which we avoided or had limited access to his emotions. As he sat on
the edge of his seat, filling the silence, there were moments when I experienced what I
can only describe as mild dissociation in which I could not anchor our shared experience
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in any affect other than an experience of anxious avoidance. Yet there were always
moments in each session, which increased in frequency and duration as we worked
together, when D slowed down, when he stopped and tried to clearly articulate and
experience what he was feeling. His reaction of coughing and wiping his face when his
eyes softened and he appeared to be feeling various affects became a signal for us to slow
down. I made this transparent in our process together, asking D directly if it would be
useful for him if I pointed out these moments so that we could slow down and explore
what he was experiencing. D agreed that this would be helpful, and in this way we
devised one entry point by which to explore D’s affects.
Just as I experienced in my body the kind of dissociative states that D brought
into the room, I also experienced moments of deep empathic connection to him in which
my own eyes softened and become tearful, or where I would laugh or smile along with
him. Sometimes I felt sadness and compassion or anger as we sat together, even when D
did not appear to be accessing these affective states himself. This suggests projective
identification, but rather than viewing this is a defense, projective identification may also
serve the adaptive function in therapy of allowing the therapist to inhabit affective
experience that cannot in the moment be accessed through language by the patient, so
that he or she is no longer alone. No doubt my affective responses were translated
through my own non-verbal communications either in tone of voice, body language,
posture, and facial expressions that were a genuine reaction to what I felt in the moment.
This further mirrored and exposed D’s affective experience.
Although Sullivan used the idea of empathic linkage to describe the ways that
mothers deposit anxiety into their children, this concept might also be applied to the
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multitude of affective states that are constantly passed back and forth between therapist
and patient through empathic attunement and the avenues by which this is expressed. As
Beebe points out in her work with adults, which draws on her experiences with infants,
non-verbal forms of communication tap into pre syntactic brain functions that help the
patient integrate and regulate their own affective experiences (Beebe et al, 2005).
Over time I came to think of D’s rapid, often affectless speech as a socially
acceptable replacement for strong affects, and as a means of integrating himself into
America in a way that his father did not. Several times in our therapy, D wondered aloud
if he would become like his father in the ways his father was silent and struggled to
connect with others. In this respect, I understood D’s rapid, anxious speech as an attempt
to connect, to fill in the silence, and to create a different identity than his father,
particularly when he could not express emotion more directly. Paradoxically, the desire
to connect and to differentiate himself from his father at the developmental crossroads of
early adulthood, also recreated a different form of disconnection from others.
My bodily experience of tiredness and being at an emotional remove that
sometimes occurred in our sessions can be understood within Bromberg’s formulation as
shared disassociated self states. Bromberg (1998) specifically speaks of self-states
disassociated through trauma, so that adaptive disassociation becomes a defense that
protects self-representation from affects too threatening to integrate into the illusion of a
unitary self. The emotions or self-states that D split or experienced as too threatening
within his relational matrix were thus surrounded by inexplicable anxiety in the present
which did not appear to be attached to any overt cause. This led to the self-understanding
that I saw in many patients including D -- namely that like D they were, by nature, very
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anxious people since there often was no apparent causal explanation for the degree of
their anxiety.
Enactment
As we met over the course of that first semester, D reported that he was feeling
less anxious in his classes. Likewise he made several friends in his residence with whom
he now regularly ate meals. As he grew up, D’s family moved to several different towns
where they were the only Moroccans. The time D spent alone in his room on his
computer mirrored the kind of cultural isolation his family experienced in these towns.
D‘s two new friends in his residence were first generation Korean-Americans, and though
D did not say so directly, I assumed that this was part of their connection at a
predominantly white college. Upon his return from the winter break, D seemed excited
for the new semester, and had seemingly cracked some of his social anxiety and isolation
through contact with his new friends.
At this time, my own caseload increased significantly as more and more students
sought counseling. In its mission statement, the counseling center states that they are a
brief treatment clinic. Although many clinicians in the system see patients longer term,
some of the staff only work within a brief treatment model. Likewise many therapists
there see patients every other week in order to fit everyone into their packed schedule. As
my own caseload mounted and I felt some anxiety as an intern about how I would
manage, I reevaluated whether weekly therapy was possible with some patients who were
not suicidal or in some other more imminent crisis. Since D seemed to be less isolated
and anxious than when he entered therapy, I decided to ask him if he would be willing to
meet every other week due to mounting demands within the system. D said that he
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understood my position and agreed without hesitation to switch over to bi-weekly
meetings.
In our first biweekly session, I did not notice any particular difference in D’s
presentation or the way he related to me. However, over the next two sessions, D reported
that he was once again experiencing panic attacks in class. His heart raced, and he
sweated profusely. This had happened to him in the past, but not in recent months. In our
third biweekly session, I asked D what he was experiencing in these moments, and he
said that he felt totally alone while surrounded by the people in his class. As we spoke of
this experience and how to address it, I felt somewhat powerless, perhaps an expression
of the way D himself felt when experiencing these panic attacks. I also felt increasingly
disconnected from D. Coupled with a sense of powerlessness in the face of his panic
attacks, I offered D some concrete ways by which he could try to soothe himself and to
reduce his panic. Together, in the office, we practiced diaphragmatic breathing,
something I did when I was on call and spoke on the phone or met with students who
were experiencing intense anxiety and panic. Likewise borrowing from some of the CBT
I had done with a couple of other patients, we explored D’s thoughts leading up to and
during his panic attacks. Then we explored alternative thoughts that might soothe him.
While D gamely joined me in these exercises, I could not help feeling like they missed
the point. Looking back, I can see that I felt guilty for reducing our contact, and it made
me feel better to offer him a concrete solution even if it was not helpful to him. At the
end of the session, as I pulled out my appointment book, I asked D whether it might be
helpful to meet in a week, and he said that he thought it would. As he stood up to leave, I
asked him whether it was hard for him to meet less frequently, and he immediately told
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me that it was harder to maintain a sense of connection. A look flashed across his face
that I had not seen before, but that I understood as barely concealed anger.
In our next session, I asked D more about how he felt about meeting bi-weekly.
He reiterated that it was hard to stay connected with me, and I asked him why he did not
say something about this sooner. He said that there was no reason for him to feel this way
since it was not my fault but the demands of my schedule at the counseling center. It
became clear that D felt he had no right to feel angry or hurt by my decision since it was
out of his and my control. In this moment, it also became clear to me that together we
enacted something very powerful for D. Throughout his childhood as D’s family moved
from place to place and when his father ultimately left, D had no agency. Whatever D felt
made no difference, since it did not change the outcome. I asked D if he ever would have
told me how he felt about meeting bi weekly if I had not brought it up. He said that he
probably would not since it was out of his control, and therefore his feelings about it did
not matter. I apologized to D for not thinking through what this change might mean for
him. I apologized for hurting him, and as we sat in this session, D seemed more present
than he had in weeks.
Over the course of the following week, I talked in supervision about what led me
to reduce our contact, and realized that it was not only the demands of the system and my
anxiety about managing it. I realized that D’s limited affective expression in our sessions
left me feeling uncertain about the importance of our work together and how he felt about
it. In a sense, like his girlfriend, I did not know what D really felt, and this created a lack
of connection and understanding in me. In our next session, I was transparent about all of
this. As the words left my lips, I realized that when I detected a slight quiver in D’s voice

	
  

78	
  

or his eyes appeared to soften this was the most that he could express. While I could
argue that my decision to decrease our time was simply my inexperience as a therapist,
this is at best a partial truth. Within his raft ride style of communicating, moments of
emotion, no mater how brief, lost some of their meaning and impact on me. Just as D did
not let himself get too attached to his friends as he grew up, I did not let myself fully
experience the attachment between us that had grown over the months. D acknowledged
that he did not express to people what they meant to him, and he realized that he had
done the same in our therapy.
It is important to observe here that D’s “anxiety symptoms” escalated after the
reduced contact following our switch to a biweekly schedule. It is also useful to
understand what occurred in our therapy and in this particular enactment within an
attachment framework. Bowlby understood separation anxiety as the corollary to
attachment. Indeed our increased separation heightened D’s anxiety, and it could be
argued that this experience activated the “primary anxiety”, that within Bowlby’s
attachment framework, is an evolutionarily adaptive part of every infant’s development.
While I do not know specifically if D suffered any particular attachment “trauma” with
his mother as an infant, this is not the important issue. Rather, D’s case powerfully
illustrates the highly adaptive function of attachment, and that if attachment behavior is
interrupted or compromised in any way, the kind of primary anxiety that Bowlby
describes, cannot be successfully comforted. While I am not arguing that adult and infant
attachment fulfill the exact same needs, they operate along similar adaptive patterns;
attachment behaviors that structure caregivers and children remain the foundation for
human development and connection, and this is no less true in therapy than in any other
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relationship. Paradoxically the forced separation and anxiety that followed the shift to
biweekly sessions with D, generated the adaptive anxiety that signaled the need to
connect, to reaffirm our attachment and all the comfort, safety and validation that comes
along with this very human process and need. Paradoxically the rupture that occurred
within our attachment provided the opportunity for repair. This allowed to D to
experience a traumatic childhood relational pattern in a connected and less anxietyproducing manner.
In this same session, I raised the issue of our impending termination since there
was only three weeks left of the semester. D expressed sadness and anxiety about
terminating, stating that he was anxious about feeling “all alone again.” I told D how
much I would miss him, and that if we worked under different circumstances within a
different system, I would love to continue working with him. As we spoke about
termination, D’s eyes began to well up, and for the first time all year he began to cry. For
a time, he could not stop. He said that the only other time he cried like this was while he
read a book in which the main character’s father leaves. He also stated that he was afraid
of crying like this because he could not stop or control it.
Here Winnicott’s notion of fear of breakdown offers another useful lens through
which to understand this moment. D’s experience of these powerful affects was not
necessarily frightening or overwhelming because they were new; rather D’s fear of a loss
of control is also a re-experiencing of psychic deaths that already occurred. While
Winnicott specifically theorizes “fear of breakdown” in relation to psychotic patients,
Winnicott’s formulation also suggests the broader fear of a fragmentation of selfexperience and fear of isolation that reenacts traumatic ruptures in past relationships.
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Here, the fear of breakdown could perhaps more usefully be framed as a fear of being
alone, a loss of connection to caregivers, or put more succinctly, the fear of traumatic
disruptions to attachment that recapitulate previous traumas.
At our next session, as we continued to process our impending termination, D
cried again in the same manner, and it was as if all the sadness, loss around disrupted
attachments, and missed connections that he had experienced for years was with us in the
room. For what was perhaps the first time all year, D leaned back in his chair and
remained silent for some time as the tears came down his cheeks. D then expressed some
confusion, fear, and embarrassment about his display of emotion. I told him that the
effect of his disclosure and emotional honesty is that it drew me closer to him, and that I
felt even more deeply connected to him as a person. There is no theory or transcription
that can capture what this session was like. I can’t help but wonder if one of the only
termination points for anxiety is through a strong loving connection to another person.
In the two weeks between these sessions, D began to express more emotion with
his two new friends and stopped worrying so much about how they would respond or
whether they really wanted to be friends with him. He felt the onset of a panic attack in
one of his classes, but he said that he felt less alone and was able to calm himself to some
extent. While I do not think D was “cured of anxiety” as a symptom, I do believe that
through our relational matrix, D was able to alter his self experience in relationships,
which reduced his anxiety. Likewise, without anxiety as a dynamic force in the process
of affective exposure and change, treatment would at best remain a conversation like
many others, stripped of an important element in the process of change.
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It is very possible that focused CBT may have reduced D’s level of anxiety just as

much, if not more so than a relational approach. But the value of anxiety reduction as a
goal of treatment is not really a worthwhile abstract discussion, since as this case
illustrates, anxiety does not exist as a separate entity apart from other relational
experiences and systems. While there is no way to manualize a relational approach or to
say that a diminishment of symptoms will occur in some set time frame in order to
appease an insurance company or the systemic demands of a given clinical setting, there
is little question to my mind that unless a patient has a distinct biological/genetic
predisposition for anxiety, anxiety symptoms, at least as they appeared in the vast
majority of college students that I saw over the course of the academic year, always exist
within a relational context. Medicating these symptoms or providing time limited more
prescriptive therapies such as CBT helps some patients, as it did several of my own. But
to medicalize anxiety as a disorder and to primarily treat it as an isolated symptom to be
eradicated, is a willful distortion of experience that eliminates treatment options that
clearly offer long lasting, satisfying and comprehensive outcomes even if they do not
work within the systemic and “empirical” prescriptions of a medical model.
As my work with D also illustrates, systems and the ways that individuals are
inextricably interwoven with them, shape the relational matrix that structures every
treatment, no matter the context. However, when systemic and socio-economic demands
determine treatment without recourse to an open, collaborative and comprehensive
assessment of an individual’s needs, a great deal is lost. I am happy that D and I were
able to repair a rupture that was in part generated by systemic demands. For many people,
especially those without certain kinds of social status and privilege, systems often
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become even more rigid and hierarchical reflecting imperatives that have little to do with
individual need or the needs of an entire community as is often the case. I hope that my
work with D helps stress the need for assessment, collaboration and treatment that is not
rigid, prescriptive or bound by allegiance to any one theory, but is responsive to the full
complexity of each person’s experience.
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Conclusion
This study has traced some of the main psychoanalytic theories of anxiety and the
ways that anxiety has been conceptualized within treatment, yet no one theory adequately
defines what anxiety is, what are its functions, and explains whether it can be defined
when understood in terms of discrete disorders. However, rather than offering a more
“definitive” theorization of anxiety and its treatment, it might be more useful to talk
about my experience reading all of the different theories that informed this work. There is
not a single theory included in this study, which did not offer insight into anxiety and the
conjoined intrapsychic and interpersonal functioning of the mind. As I immersed myself
in each theory, I often felt that the writer was capturing something essential about anxiety
and lived experience. For better or worse, since its inception psychoanalysis has offered
totalizing theories and also sought to explain anxiety in a similar way, attempting to
capture what is beyond explanation. Immersed in the depth of each theorization, I often
found myself feeling as though it achieved its goal, and the working of anxiety in the
mind and body was now manifest. But this always turned out to be an illusion endemic to
powerfully articulated systems of thought. For as soon as I read a new theory, I often felt
equally immersed and convinced.

	
  

84	
  
As I hope my discussion illustrates, the explanatory power of different theoretical

frames can always unlock new understandings, but no one theory can embody the “truth.”
The premise of relational theory is that there are multiple, often competing truths.
Meanings, ideas and experiences extrapolated through different theories can exist
alongside each other without forcing an individual to conform to a certain theory or
approach which rests on a truth claim about a phenomenon like anxiety, it functions and
treatment. However, the fundamental premise of this study, that anxiety can best be
understood and treated within the particularities of a relational matrix that is unique in
some sense for each person, is itself a centering truth, but one that currently seems to
offer the farthest and broadest view into the distance with the fewest obstructions.
CBT and medication are also part of this relational landscape and are not
antithetical to psychodynamic treatment. As Paul Wachtel argues, there is a great deal of
overlap in some ideas, since at their core, every mental health treatment is in some sense
relational. However, treatments that focus on eradicating or reducing a specific symptom
like anxiety exist in an easy dialectic with the current medical model, and the very
symmetry of this union can obscure all that it leaves out. This symbiosis also presents a
particularly difficult challenge for substantiating the validity of psychodynamic
treatment. Indeed the very structure of this thesis and the phenomenon chapter that begins
it belies an inherent tension between psychoanalysis and the evidence based medical
model. Within this dominant system, psychoanalysis must try to become systematized
and prescriptive in order to render itself quantifiable and therefore viable. Yet the very
nature of psychodynamic theory and relational treatment presumes that a phenomenon
like anxiety is not necessarily a disorder, and can also only exist within the idiosyncratic
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relational matrix of each individual. This makes a prescribed treatment difficult if not
impossible to delineate. In this regard psychoanalysis is left trying to produce evidence
within an empirical classification system that runs counter to its very logic, a system that
often ignores the contextual and personal nature of self-experience.
There is little doubt that D experienced a great deal of intra psychic and
interpersonal anxiety, but this took shape over the course of a life that was defined by
relational experiences within various systems including his family and more broadly by
his family’s particular experience of immigration to the United States, and the socioeconomic, cultural, and emotional impact that this adjustment had on them. Likewise in
treatment with me, D’s anxiety did not exist as an isolated symptom but waxed and
waned, and over time appeared to dissipate as our relational matrix unfolded, and our
connection and attachment offered the space for new self-representation and experiences.
No case study, series of case studies, or empirical study can make the validity of a given
treatment approach generalizable for all people. However, the bias of this study is that
every person’s experience is richly contextual and relational. Any treatment that willfully
ignores this on the basis of “evidence” supported by a dominant paradigm, runs the risk
of prioritizing systemic imperatives driven by socio-economic forces and ideology, over
the needs of the individual and the communities of which they are a part.
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